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Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has for nearly 
one hundred years remained largely unused. However, with the Monroe 
v. Pape decision reached in 1961, Section 1983 came to be used as a 
tool in litigating civil rights claims in federal courts. It has 
become the major piece of federal legislation affecting school boards 
in employment decisions. 
This study is the product of both historical and legal 
research. The creation and evolution of Section 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 were researched to explore the era of history in 
which the Act was enacted and to trace the developments and changes 
of the Act. Cases involving the freedom of speech for public school 
teachers based on Section 1983 were then found and briefed. 
Based on an analysis of the data the following conclusions are 
drawn: (1) teachers enjoy basically the same degree of freedom of 
speech as do other citizens; (2) the state does, however, have a 
contervailing interest in limiting the speech of teachers that causes 
disruptions to the educational system; (3) the speech of teachers is, 
therefore, protected provided it is on issues of public concern; 
(4) the private lives of teachers including their membership in 
organizations, their dress and appearance is protected as long as it 
does not result in disruptions to the educational process; and 
(5) Section 1983 provides for civil remedies for those individuals 
whose constitutional rights of free speech have been abridged. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
One of the most important pieces of federal legislation that 
affects school boards and administrators was written during the years 
following the American Civil War. This legislation was originally 
designed to help protect the rights of American Negroes during the 
period of history known as Reconstruction. It was one thing for 
congress to pass and the states to ratify an amendment that gave 
former slaves all benefits of citizenship. It was still another 
matter for the freed slaves to enjoy the protections and rights that 
the Constitution bestowed on them. As a result, Congress passed a 
number of acts clarifying the rights of blacks, Section 1983 being 
only one of such acts. Over a century later, Section 1983 has been 
viewed as being one of the most significant pieces of reconstruction 
legislation. 
This legislation, known as Section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, remained relatively unknown ans unused until the 1960s. 
In 1961 the Supreme Court expanded Section 1983 with its decision in 
Monroe v. PapeJ That decision allowed government officials to be 
sued for Section 1983 violations. Through this and similar decisions, 
Section 1983 was in effect no longer limited in coverage only to 
^ U.S. 167 (1961). 
2 
blacks, but rather included all categories of citizens subject to 
superordinate control under state action. The expanded interpretation 
of this act thus included teachers. 
Purpose of This Study 
The purpose of this study was to determine to what extent 
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has been applicable to 
public school teachers in the exercise of their freedom of speech 
and expression as provided for in the first amendment of the federal 
Constitution. 
Significance of This Study 
The significance of this study is based on the tremendous 
reliance on Section 1983 in litigation between school employees and 
their superordinates. The American society, as all free societies, 
is in a continuing state of change. In recent years there has been 
a tremendous change both in how teachers view themselves as well as 
how society views them. In the past, many people thought that 
teaching was more of an appointment or a reward from the local 
governing body than a profession. Teachers had to lead a lifestyle 
that would not focus attention upon themselves from the citizens 
of the area. Their references were checked to assure that their 
lifestyles were in keeping with the community. To illustrate this 
point, listed below are a group of rules for teachers for the year 
1872 and a contract and a reference form for the Wilson, North 
Carolina school system. 
1872 
Rules For Teachers 
Teachers each day will fill lamps, clean chimneys. 
Each teacher will bring a bucket of water and a scuttle of 
coal for the day's session. 
Make your pens carefully. You may whittle nibs to the 
individual taste of the pupils. 
Men teachers may take one evening each week for courting 
purposes or two evenings a week if they go to church 
regularly. 
After ten hours in school, the teachers may spend the 
remaining time reading the Bible or other good books. 
Women teachers who marry or engage in unseemly conduct will 
be dismissed. 
Each teacher should lay aside from each pay a goodly sum of 
his earnings for his benefit during his declining years so 
that he will not become a burden on society. 
Any teacher who smokes, uses liquor in any form, frequents 
pool or public halls, or gets shaved in a barber shop will 
give good reason to suspect his worth, intention, integrity 
and honesty. 
The teacher who performs his labor faithfully and without 
fault for five years will be given an increase of twenty-
five cents per week in his pay, providing the Board of 
Education approves/ 
FORM OF CONTRACT 
WILSON CITY AND COUNTRY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Teacher's Contract 
I hereby accept a position as a teacher in the Wilson 
Public Schools for the years 192 and 192 at a salary 
of $ for the school year of months. My N.C. 
Certificate is Numer , Class . I have had 
years experience. My N.C. Certificate expires July 1, 192 
p 
1872 Rules For Teachers (Student National Education Associa 
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I further agree that I will take a vital interest in church 
and Sunday school work and other community activities; that 
I will not entertain company until late hours at night and 
thus render my school work next day inefficient; that I will 
not attend sorry moving picture and vaudeville shows; that 
I will not fall in love or become familiar with high school 
pupils; that I will not attend card dancing parties; that I 
will not fail to use my good sense and discretion in the 
company I keep; that I will use my best endeavors during 
the year to improve my work as a teacher; and that I will do 
nothing to bring disrepute on the home in which I live or 
to cause right thinking people to speak disparagingly of me 
and my work. 
This day of , 192 .3 
M 
Dear : 
1. M of has give me 
your name as one who can tell me of her ability as a 
teacher, etc. 
2. Some Wilson teachers, 1923-24, have failed for the following 
reasons: (a) lack of knowledge of subject matter and 
inability to manage children; (b) attention to card playing, 
dancing and other society interests to the neglect of their 
school work; (c) on account of falling in love with high 
school pupils; (d) on account of keeping the company of 
sorry men; (e) on account of night riding without a 
chaperon; (f) on account of attendance of rotten vaudeville 
and sorry moving picture shows; (g) on account of enter­
taining company until late hours at night, making good work 
next day impossible; (h) on account of failure to take any 
vital interest in church and Sunday school work and other 
community activities. 
3. If you think this applicant will and can avoid all the 
above sources of failure, I shall appreciate your saying so. 
3 
Teacher Contract for the Wilson City and County, North 
Carolina Board of Education. Courtesy of H. C. Hudgins. 
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If you think there is doubt about her having good sense 
to avoid these sources of failure, I shall appreciate 
your frankness. We are after teachers who are in earnest 
about doing what they are paid to do. We prefer that all 
other kinds go elsewhere. 
4. Answer: 
5. Reply sent to Supt. C..L. Coone, Wilson, N.C. on day 
of , 1924.4 
As teaching has taken a more professional identity, teachers 
have become more assertive regarding their civil rights. A number of 
teacher unions and associations are now demanding equal treatment with 
other professions. These unions also demand all civil rights and 
privileges that other professions enjoy. Teachers want it to be made 
known that they, like students, "do not leave their constitutional 
g 
rights on the school house steps." 
Many educators perceive a growing rift in the fabric of the 
educational community. Principals are often viewed as becoming more 
and more removed from the issues that affect teachers and, conse­
quently, are looked on with suspicion by teachers. A similar compari­
son can be made regarding superintendent and principal relationships. 
There appears to be a constant struggle for power between the different 
administrative levels of education. 
As a result of these changes, there has been a tremendous growth 
in the amount of litigation that deals with educational issues and 
4 Teacher Reference Form, Wilson, North Carolina, Board of 
Education. Courtesy of H. C. Hudgins. 
5 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969). 
6 
personnel. Prior to the 1940s there were relatively few court 
decisions that affected education. By contrast, currently teachers 
are instructed in education courses to, "either know your school law 
or to know your school lawyer."6 Prior to 1960 only 280 Section 1983 
suits were filed in federal court. In contrast, thirteen thousand 
Section 1983 suits were filed in 1983Thomas Shannon, editor of 
The Yearbook of School Law, reported that in a five-year period the 
O 
use of Section 1983 litigation increased some one thousand percent. 
There are four basic reasons for the dramatic increase in the 
use of Section 1983 as a vehicle in litigating cases based on a 
deprivation of civil rights. First, there is no statute of limitation 
on Section 1983 suits in federal courts. This is important in that 
limitation statutes vary from one state to another. Second, a Section 
1983 action does not require the exhaustion of administrative reme­
dies. A Section 1983 claim can originate either in a federal court 
or a state court. In addition, greater remedies are allowed on cases 
based on Section 1983 than litigation sought through other types of 
claims. Plaintiffs can receive compensatory and punitive damages as 
£ 
Quote taken from Guy T. Swain, Professor of Education, 
Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina. 
^Ralph Mawdsley and Steve Permuth, "Private Schools' Tax 
Exempt Status and Application of Section 1983." School Law Update. 
NOLPE, 1984, p. 47. 
8Richard S. Vacca, "Section 1983 Liability: Recent Develop­
ments in the Merger of State and Federal Remedies." School Law 
Update. NOLPE, 1985, p. 81. 
7 
well as equitable relief. Finally, a Section 1983 claim requires 
fewer procedural requirements than either a Title VII or a Title IX 
9 claim. 
Research Questions 
There are several extremely important questions that this study 
seeks to answer: 
1. To what extent does Section 1983 protect teachers in areas 
of private and public verbal and written criticisms of a 
superordinate? 
2. To what extent does Section 1983 protect teachers with 
regards to academic freedom to speak on controversial 
issues in the classroom? 
3. To what extent does Section 1983 protect the rights of 
teachers to regulate their dress and appearance? 
4. To what extent does Section 1983 protect teachers that 
enga e in political and union activity? 
5. To what extent are public school teachers protected by 
Section 1983 in their social lifestyle including their 
sexual preferences? 
6. What remedies are available to teachers whose rights have 
been abridged by their superordinates? 
g 
"Private School's Tax Exempt Status and Application of 
Section 1983." School Law Update, p. 48. 
8 
Methodology 
This study was the product of both historical and legal 
research. Historical research was a necessary component as it is 
important for one to understand the era of history in which the first 
group of civil rights laws were enacted. Also, since this study was 
designed to trace the application of Section 1983 from the landmark 
Pickering v. Board of Education^ in 1968 to 1986, historical research 
was necessary. To this end many articles and books were used to trace 
the growth and change of court decisions of both freedom of speech and 
the tremendous increase of the number of cases based on Section 1983. 
Cases involving Section 1983 that pertained to the topic of 
freedom of speech for teachers came from four primary sources. The 
broad topic "Schools" was located in American Jurisprudence. Under 
the heading "Teachers and Other Employees" was then located. Under 
this subtopic it became apparent that sections 161 to 214 were appro­
priate. Each case from the citations was then reviewed and those not 
applicable to the study were discarded. Corpus Juris Secundum, 
another multi-volume work, was handled in a similar fashion. The 
broad subject heading "Schools and School Districts" was found. Under 
this heading the subtopic, "Teachers, Principals, and Superintendents" 
was located. Cases listed under this subtopic were then reviewed to 
determine their application to the topic of this study. Possibly the 
best help in locating primary sources was the system of ALR2nd, ALR3rd 
and ALR Federal. These proved invaluable in locating both cases and 
10391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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statutes. The American Digest System was then examined for appellate 
court decisions rendered from 1968 to 1986. After appellate court 
cases were located by key number 13.12(8) in the American Digest 
System, each case was then located in the legal indices such as the 
Federal Supplement, Federal Reporter, and the Supreme Court Reporter. 
The North Carolina Lawyers Research Center also provided numerous case 
citations involving Section 1983 and the abridgment of teacher's first 
amendment freedoms. The cases revealed by these citations were also 
read for their applicability to this study. These citations identi­
fied from all of the sources above were also checked against the 1968 
to 1986 volumes of the Yearbook of School Law published by the 
National Organization On Legal Problems of Education (NOLPE). 
Cases that were determined to be applicable to this study were 
then briefed or summarized into four areas: (1) the background or 
facts in the case, (2) the question(s) of law to be decided by the 
court, (3) the decision reached by the court, and (4) the rationale 
used by the court in making its decisions. 
Supplementing the primary sources listed above were a variety 
of secondary sources found in the libraries of the Universities of 
North Carolina at Asheville and Greensboro, East Tennessee State 
University in Johnson City, Tennessee, and Wake Forest Law Library. 
They included books and journal articles located through The Index 
to Legal Periodicals, the Education Index and the Reader's Guide to 
Periodicals. These secondary sources were read to determine their 
applicability to the study of Section 1983 and teachers' freedom of 
10 
speech. Information on this topic was made possible through card 
catalog searches conducted through the two libraries mentioned 
earlier. Definitions of legal terms were found in Black's Law 
Dictionary and The Law of Public Education. 
Five unpublished dissertations that paralleled this topic 
were found from a dissertation abstract search. The dissertations 
proved helpful in providing an overview of teacher freedom of speech 
in general and Section 1983 specifically.^ 
Delimitations of the Study 
Not all issues involving either Section 1983 or teacher's free­
dom of speech have been included in this study. Both of these topics 
are far too broad to cover adequately in a study such as this. 
Teacher freedom of speech only as it relates to Section 1983 was 
included in this study. The following are further delimitations cf 
this study: 
1. This research did not treat all questions of teacher's 
freedoms of speech and expression. 
The four unpublished dissertations that were used as a 
general type reference are: (1) Glend D. Nichols, "Insubordination 
as a Basis for the Dismissal of Professional Employees of t.he Public 
Schools," University of Arkansas, 1985, (2) Edward Ernest Fink, "The 
Interpretation of Academic Freedom in Relation to Civil Rights for 
Professional Employees in the Public Schools," University of Pitts­
burg, 1980, (3) Richard R. Bertocki, "An Analysis of Appellate Court 
Decisions Determining the Authority of Boards of Education and Their 
Agents to Establish Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of 
Pupils, 1960-1983," University of Pittsburg, 1984, (4) Virginia Ann 
Maroney, "The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity with Regard to Educa­
tional Tort Liability," Syracuse University, 1984, and (5) E. Wayne 
Trogdon, "The Effect of the Civil Rights Law of 1871 on Teacher Dis­
missal," University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1980. 
11 
2. This study only concerned itself with questions of teacher 
freedom of speech and expression that were based on 
Section 1983. 
3. Only the period from the 1968 Pickering v. Board of Educa-
12 tion decision of 1968 up to and including 1986 were 
covered. 
4. This study was limited to only an examination of cases 
involving public school teachers in grades kindergarten 
through the twelfth grade. 
5. Litigation between school employees and their superordi-
nates that was resolved prior to going into a court of 
record was not treated. 
6. Both state and federal court decisions of record were 
addressed. 
7. Cases that involved issues other than Section 1983 were 
treated only to the extent that Section 1983 was germane 
to the issue and its resolution before the court. The 
exception to this are some cases in Chapter II that were 
included to demonstrate the historical change in freedom 
of speech for teachers and the public in general. 
8. This research did not directly attempt to address civil 
rights infringements other than those involving free 
speech granted by the first amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
12391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
12 
Definition of Terms Used 
The following are definitions of terms that were used in this 
study: 
1. Freedom of Expression. Freedom of expression is defined 
as the right guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. It includes by definition, freedoms of speech, 
13 religion and association. 
2. Color of Law. Color of law is defined as, "The appearance 
of semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuses of 
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because 
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state, is action taken 
under color of law."^ 
3. Amicus Curiae. Amicus Curiae means "friend of the court." 
A person with a strong interest in the court action of another may 
petition the court for permission to file a brief. This is commonly 
15 done in civil rights cases. 
4. Appellant. The term appellant has to do with someone or 
something making an appeal to a higher body. The term is used to 
signify the difference between original jurisdiction and appellent 
jurisdiction J6 
13 Joseph R. Noland and M.J. Connolly, Black's Law Dictionary. 
Fifth Edition. West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minnesota, 1979, 
p. 598. 
14Ibid.» p. 241. 
15Ibid, p. 75. 
16Ibid., p. 89. 
13 
5. Appellee. The appellee is the party in a cause against 
whom an appeal is taken. It is the person that does not want the 
judgment set aside or reversed.^ 
6. Certiorari. Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior 
court to an inferior court requiring the inferior court to produce 
a certified record of a particular case tried. The term is uded 
most commonly at the Supreme Court level where a writ of certiorari 
1ft is used to determine which case the high court will hear. 
7. Class Action or Class or Representative Action. A class 
action provides a means in which a large group of people are 
interested in a matter and allow one or more individuals to bring 
19 
suit as a representative for the class. 
8. Clear and Present Danger Doctrine. This doctrine was first 
20 stated in the case, Schenck v. U.S. The doctrine provides that 
governmental restriction on freedom of speech and press will be 
upheld if needed to prevent danger to interests which the government 
21 may lawfully protect. 
9. Declaratory Judgment. A declaratory judgment is one that 
is agreed upon by the parties to a suit and approved by a court. A 
17Ibid., p. 90. 
18Ibid., p. 207. 
19Ibid., p. 226. 
20297 U.S. 47 (1919). 
21 Ibid., p. 227. 
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declaratory judgment is not the result of judicial determina­
tion.22 
10. Petitioner. A petitioner is one who presents a petition 
to a court, officer or legislative body. The term also signifies 
23 the person or group that takes an appeal from a judgment. 
11. Remand. To remand a case denotes when a higher court 
sends the case back to the court from which it came for further 
24 action. 
12. Res Judicata. Res Judicata is a term meaning that the 
highest court of competent jurisdiction has settled a matter on the 
merits of the case. It constitutes an absolute bar on further action 
25 involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. 
13. Summary Judgment. A summary judgment is a term used in a 
civil action which permits any party to move for an immediate judgment 
when he believes that there is no basis for the claim as a matter of 
law.26 
14. Supra. The term supra refers the reader to the previous 
27 part of the book or page. 
22 E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., The Law of Public Education. Third 
Edition. The Foundation Press, Inc., 1985, p. 908. 
23 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1032. 
24Ibid., p. 1162. 
25Ibid., p. 1174. 
26Ibid., p. 1287. 
27Ibid., p. 1291. 
15 
15. Vacate. Vacate means to set aside, to declare null and 
28 void, to rescind. 
16. Non obstante veredicto. A judgment entered by the court 
29 
notwithstanding the finding of the verdict for the other party. 
30 17. Sub Judice. Under judicial consideration. 
28Ibid., p. 1388. 
29Ibid., p. 952. 
30Ibid., p. 1278. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 has evolved through court decisions to 
become one of the most used federal laws in employee termination liti­
gation. To better understand the law and its significance this chapter 
will be divided into three main areas: (1) the origin of the act, 
(2) the components arid requirements of the act, and (3) certain 
selected cases that show the development and expansion of the applica­
tion of the first amendment right as it relates to teachers. 
Background of the Reconstruction Period 
Civil Rights Laws 
At the close of the American Civil War, Congress passed the 
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. 
These amendments abolished slavery and gave the former slaves both 
citizenship and the right to vote. These amendments also gave Congress 
potentially broad sources of power both to secure and protect individ­
ual and personal liberties.1 Because of these new congressional powers 
and the obvious disregard by many people in the South for the Negroes' 
newly created liberties and freedoms, Congress took further measures 
to enforce the amendments. Seven civil rights statutes were passed. 
\ee Modjeska, Handline Employment Discrimination Cases. 
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co.: Rochester, New York. T580. 
p. 139. 
17 
Of the seven, five were general, while two were specific. The first 
act, enacted on April 9, 1866, was entitled, "An Act to Protect All 
Persons in The United States in Their Civil Rights, and Furnish the 
2 Means of Their Vindication." The purpose of the act was the elimina­
tion of the "Black Codes" of the southern states. Now known as 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983, the law provides equal rights to blacks and whites 
and is used 1n discrimination cases. The second act was passed on 
May 31, 1870. It was entitled "An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens 
of the United States to Vote in the Several States of This Union and 
4 for Other Purposes." This act was later amended by an act of 
February 28, 1871. The expressed purpose of these acts was to imple­
ment the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the Constitution. 
The Civil Rights Act of April 21, 1871 was written in an attempt 
to help protect the freedoms of the newly emancipated slaves during the 
period of American history known as Reconstruction. On March 21, 1871, 
President Grant sent to Congress a special message requesting legisla­
t i o n  t o  d e a l  w i t h  w h a t  h e  c a l l e d  " A  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a f f a i r s  . . .  i n  
some of the States of the Union rendering life and property insecure." 
Congress acted swiftly on the President's request and in one month 
2 Robert K. Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights: Quest for 
a Sword. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York. 1947. p. 39. 
^See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, (1968) and 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, (1975). 
^Federal.Protection of Civil Rights, p. 40. 
18 
5 
enacted the legislation. The law was enacted as Section I of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, and was designed to enforce the pro­
visions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution—the amendment 
that gave the slaves citizenship.® The act was originally designed as 
a remedy to protect the newly created citizens from abuses brought 
about by state government officials during the period following each 
state's readmission to the Union.^ The act provided criminal penalties 
for conspiracies against governmental or court operations. It 
authorized the President to use federal troops against conspirators, 
suspend habeas corpus as needed, and established civil liabilities for 
Q 
the deprivation of civil rights. This law was extremely unpopular in 
g 
the South and was known as the "Southern-outrage Repression Bill." 
The section of the law still applicable today is known as Section 1983. 
It states: 
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights, Part I. 
Bernard Schwartz, ed. Chelsea House Publishers: New York. 1970. 
p. 591. 
6R1chard S. Vacca, "Section 1983 Liability: Recent Developments 
in the Merger of State and Federal Remedies." School Law Update. 
National Organization on Legal Problems of Education: Topeka, Kansas. 
1980, a5 80-81. (Vacca notes that this material was taken from his and 
H. C. Hudgins', Liability of School Officials and Administrators for 
Civil Rights Torts"! 1982.) 
^American Jurisprudence. Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing 
Company: Rochester, New York. 1976. p. 305. 
O 
Handling Employment Discrimination Cases, p. 143. 
9Ibid. 
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United States or other person within the Jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act to Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered 
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.'0 
The Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875 was entitled "An Act to 
Protect all Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights."^ The purpose 
of this act was to provide or "guarantee the Negroes equal accommoda­
tions with white citizens 1n all inns, public conveyances, theaters, 
12 and other places of amusement." 
The two remaining statutes were very specific. They were known 
as (1) The Slave Kidnapping Act of May 21, 1866, which made it a 
federal crime to "kidnap or carry away a person with the intention of 
placing him in slavery or involuntary servitude"; and (2) The Peonage 
Abolition Act, signed on March 2, 1867, which prohibited the "System 
of Peonage in the Territory of New Mexico and Other Parts of the United 
States."^3 
Most of these civil rights laws passed by Congress during the 
Reconstruction period were short lived for a variety of reasons. First 
First, one must note the "mood" of Congress when they were passed. 
These acts were passed by a group of congressmen known as the "Radical 
^Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. As amended by the Act of December 
29, 1979, Public Law Number 96-170, Section 1, 93 Stat. 1284. 
^Federal Protection of Civil Rights, p. 38. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
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Republicans." They were interested in protecting the rights of Negroes 
and also punishing the South. Secondly, many of these laws were 
declared invalid by the Supreme Court. The Court in six decisions in a 
period of thirty years declared many of the provisions of the legisla­
tion listed above as unconstitutional.^ The third reason was that 
many of the provisions were eventually repealed by Congress. Finally, 
there was an increasing amount of reluctance to use the authority left 
15 - „• » 
in the legislation. There were a total of 7,372 criminal prosecu­
tions based on all civil rights statutes between 1870 and 1897. Of 
these prosecutions, 5,172 took place in the South. Approximately only 
16 
twenty percent of the prosecutions resulted in convictions. Only 
twenty-one cases based on a Section 1983 claim .were heard by federal 
courts between 1871 and 1920 with only nine of those cases reaching the 
Supreme Court.^ The number of cases based on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
has continued to expand. There were twenty-one Section 1983 cases 
litigated In 1944, 116 in 1948 and 196 in 1956.^® Judge Magruder 
offered an explanation for the increase in the use of 42 U.S.C. 
14C1vi1 Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
15 
Federal Protection of Civil Rights, p. 41. 
^Thomas Emerson and David Haber, Political and Civil Rights in 
the United States. Vol. 1. Dennis and Company: Buffalo, New York. 
1958. p. 46. 
17 Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of What Law: A Reconstructed 
Model of Section 1983 Liability." Virginia Law Review. Vol. 71. 
May 1985. p. 499. 
18 Thomas Emerson and David Haber, Political and Civil Rights in 
the United States. Vol. 1. Dennis and Company: Buffalo, New York. 
1958. p. 82. 
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19 Section 1983 in Francis v. Lyman by stating: 
As is well known, the statute in question was originally 
enacted by the Congress in the turbulent days of Recon­
struction. For many years the enactment remained on the 
books, in a somewhat dormant state; and the Congress has 
never taken occasion to revise or modify the statutory 
language substantially. It may be that this is to be 
explained by the fact that until recent years resourceful 
plaintiffs' lawyers have not sought, in a significant 
number of cases, to invoke the application of the Civil 
Rights Act in situations far removed from those which 
were no doubt predominantly in the minds of the members 
of Congress of 1871 when they first enacted the legisla­
tion.2^ 
Provisions of Section 1983 
The 1871 law known as Section 1983 created a vehicle which 
easily allows individuals to bring suit in both state and federal 
21 courts for violations of both constitutional and statutory rights. 
Constantly being expanded by court decisions, this law has become a 
means whereby individual liberties and property rights are protected 
against erosion by individuals acting under what is known as "color of 
state law." To help the reader understand the law, Section 1983 has 
been broken down in this study into the following six components: 
(1) evolution of Section 1983, (2) Section 1983 plaintiffs, (3) color 
of law, (4) deprivation of rights, (5) immunities from Section 1983 
action, and (6) remedies for violations based on Section 1983. 
19216 F. 2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954). 
20Id. at 585. 
^Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, (1980). The Court, in a 
decision concerning the deprivation of welfare entitlement under 
the Social Security Act, held that Section 1983 protects federal 
statutory rights as well as constitutional rights. 
22 
1. Evolution of Section 1983. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 has 
during the twenty-seven years since 1960 continued to evolve to become 
one of the most important pieces of federal legislation concerning 
civil rights. Much of the evolutionary process of Section 1983 has 
been through the different levels of federal court opinions. There 
have been at least three extremely important cases that have caused 
Section 1983 to become so popular as a litigious tool for a civil 
22 rights violation. Prior to Monroe v. Pape agents of a governing 
body were not held liable under Section 1983 since they were con­
sidered, like a governmental agency, to be immune from prosecution. 
The Monroe decision held that, unlike a governmental agency, an 
official could be held liable for civil rights' violations. 
In 1966 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
23 Johnson v. Branch held that school board members could be held 
liable under Section 1983. The Supreme Court eight years later stated 
that officials of a governmental body, including a board of education, 
had considerably less protection under a Section 1983 claim than did 
22365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
23364 F. 2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966). 
23 
24 25 
the political body itself. In Mood v. Strickland, a landmark 
decision reached the next year, the Court granted to members of a 
governing body what it called "qualified good faith immunity." The 
Court, in a case that centered on the deprivation of rights of 
students, stated that members of a school board could be sued if they 
26 
violated the constitutional rights of students. 
The Monroe decision was vacated in 1978 with the Supreme Court 
27 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services. In Monel1 
the Supreme Court ruled that a local governing body could be sued and 
damages could be collected if the "government's policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that 
2ft the government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983. 
24 
Schuer v. Rhoads, 416 U.S. 233 (1974). This case involved 
the parents of three slain students at Kent State University sueing 
James Rhodes, Governor of Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In the 
Schuer case the court said . . . "Section 1983 would be drained of 
meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high 
executive officer have the quality of a supreme and unchangeable 
edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property and unreviewable 
through the judicial powers of the Federal government." (at 248) 
25420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
26 
The Court stated, "Therefore, in the specific context of 
school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not immune 
from liability for damages under Section 1983 if he knew or reason­
ably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of 
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of 
student affected, or if he took the action with malicious intention 
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to 
the student." 
27436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
28Id. at 694. 
24 
Two years later the Court again spoke to the issue of the 
applicability of suits against government officials in Owen v. City of 
29 Independence. In Owen the Supreme Court held that local governing 
bodies may be more vulnerable to Section 1983 suits than their 
officers. The Court further held that if a governing body, either 
through custom or policy, violates or abridges the constitutional 
rights of others, the governing body has no immunity from damages. 
In its opinion, the Court continued to support the idea of "good 
faith immunity" presented in Wood. 
2. Section 1983 Plaintiffs. Federal law and court decisions 
control the standing of plaintiffs to bring suit under Section 1983. 
30 This was made clear in the cases, Almong v. Kent and Pierson v. 
Grant.^ Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a person who had been sub­
jected to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the federal Constitution or laws through acts by individuals acting 
under "color of law" can become a plaintiff under a Section 1983 
action. 
The term, "every person," has been broadened through litigation 
to include many other groups. In 1976 a federal court ruled in 
Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores De 
29445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
30459 F. 2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972). 
31347 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Iowa, 1973) 
25 
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Otero that aliens may become plaintiffs under Section 1983. In the 
33 New York case, Holley v. Lavine, the court ruled that even an alien 
who was in the country illegally could become a plaintiff under 
Section 1983. 
Corporations have through a period of time come to be con­
sidered an "other person" in regards to Section 1983 when a suit is 
34 35 based on its own behalf. In Grosjean v. American Press Company 
and Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization the Supreme Court 
ruled that only naturalized persons can be citizens of the United 
States. However, the court also ruled that a corporation could be 
considered to be a person within the meaning of the equal protection 
and due process of law clauses. 
426 U.S. 572 (1976). This case dealt with the applicability 
of Section 1983 and to the standing of citizens of Puerto Rico to 
bring a Section 1983 claim into federal court. The Court in a some­
what similar case, Graham v. Richardson, 402 U.S. 365 (1971) ruled 
that Section 1983 protects "any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof." 
33529 F. 2d 1294 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 964, 
(1979). 
34 
Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F. 2d 9 (1st Cir. 
1979), vacated on other grounds, 454 U.S. 807 (1981); Fulton Market 
Cold Storage Company v. Cullerton, 582 F. 2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); Adams v. City of Park Ridqe, 
293~F. 2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961). 
35297 U.S. 233 (1936). This case involved newspaper publishers 
who brought suit against the state of Louisiana against the enforce­
ment of a license tax. 
36307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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Like corporations, labor unions and unincorporated associations 
can be Section 1983 plaintiffs. The Supreme Court, in Allee v. 
37 
Medrano held that "unions may sue under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 as 
persons deprived of their rights secured by the Constitution and 
38 on 
laws." A federal court in Aguayo v. Richardson held that unin­
corporated associations and groups can sue in Section 1983 actions 
for injuries to the group itself and not to individual members. 
40 
However, in NAACP v. Alabama and Memphis American Federation of 
41 Teachers v. Board of Education the Supreme Court and a lower court 
both recognized the standing of certain groups to protect the rights 
of their members. A state may sue under Section 1983 as parens patrie 
42 to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens. 
There are several classes or groups of individuals and organi­
zations that have been considered not to be an "other person" as 
related to their standing as plaintiffs in suits based on Section 
1983. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed without an 
37416 U.S. 802 (1974). 
38Id-
39473 F. 2d 1090, cert, denied. 414 U.S. 1146 (1973). 
40357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
41534 F. 2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976) 
A O  
Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, (3rd Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied. 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). The United States government in 
United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F. 2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1980), 
and a municipality of City of Safe Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F. 2d 
1251 (5th Cir. 1976) have been denied the standing of plaintiff in 
actions based on Section 1983. 
27 
opinion that an unborn fetus was not a "person" in McGarvey v. Magee 
43 
Womens Hospital. In 1979 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
44 in Guyton v. Phillips held that the "other person" status ended 
with an individual's death. In at least two cases, however, Wolfer v. 
Thaler45 and Galindo v. Browne!!46 courts ruled that parents had 
standing to bring Section 1983 actions for the death of their chil­
dren. 
3. Color of Law. The term "under color of law" in Section 
1983 cases refers to color of state law. The United Supreme Court in 
47 Monroe v. Pape defined the term as the "misuse of power possessed 
by virtue of state law which is made possible only because the wrong-
48 doer is clothed with the authority of state law." Courts have 
stated that local officers and employees acted "under color of law" 
when they performed their official duties to the prescribed limit or 
excess of that limit. The Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
49 Company explained the requirements of the "color of law" 
43340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd. 474 F. 2d 1339 
(3rd Cir. 1973). 
44606 F. 2d 248 (9th Cir. 1979). 
45525 F. 2d 977, (5th Cir. 1976) cert, denied, 425 U.S. 975 
(1977). 
46255 F. Supp. 930, (S.D. Cal., 1966). 
47Supra. 
48Id, at 184. 
49639 F. 2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), revg. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
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prerequisite as: 
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the state, or a rule 
of conduct imposed by the state, or by a person for whom 
the state is responsible . . . Second, the party charged 
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be 
said to be a state official, or because he has acted 
together with or has obtained significant aid from state 
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable 
to the state.50 
Sometimes private parties or organizations can be considered 
to be acting under "color of law" if they perform activities usually 
considbred to be state functions. The Court of Appeals for the 
51 Second Circuit in Jackson v. Statler Foundation listed five factors 
that determine to what extent a private person can be held to have 
acted under "color of law." They are: 
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is 
dependent on governmental aid; (2) the extent and intru-
siveness of the governmental regulatory scheme; (3) whether 
that scheme connotes government approval of the activity 
or whether the assistance is merely provided to all with­
out such connotation; (4) the extent to which the organiza­
tion serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for 
the state: (5) whether the organization has legitimate 
claims to recognition as a "private" organization in 
associational or constitutional terms.52 
A wide variety of both voluntary groups and professions can be 
considered to be acting under "color of law." Examples of these 
private institutions or individuals include: private volunteer fire 
50Id. at 937. 
51496 F. 2d 623 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 927 
(1975). 
52Id. at 629. 
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departments, private foundling homes, civil process servers, and the 
53 
commissioners of a collegiate athletic conference. Those individ­
uals who work for and are salaried by funds originating from state 
or local agencies are usually considered to be acting under "color 
of law." 
Failure to do something can also be considered to be acting 
under "color of law." This occurs when state officials fail to 
54 exercise a legal duty or obligation. 
4. Deprivation of Rights. One of the basic requirements for 
a Section 1983 action is that an individual be deprived of his 
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
55 laws." The fourteenth amendment states in part: "Nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
56 equal protection of the laws." The Supreme Court in Maine v. 
57 Thiboutot interpreted Section 1983 to include violations of selected 
federal statutory law as well as the Constitution. 
53 Williams v. Rescue Fire Company, 254 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. Md. 
1966), Carrasco v. Klein, 381 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. NY. 1974), Stanley v. 
Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mo. 1978). 
54Smith v. Ross, 482 F. 2d 33 (6th Cir. 1973), and Huey v. 
Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. 111. 1967). 
5542 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
56 United States Constitution. Amendment XIV. 
57 
Supra. This decision was modified by Pennhurst State School 
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) and Middlesex County Sewerage Author­
ity v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
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Most Section 1983 claims arise from a deprivation of either a 
first, fourth or eighth amendment right. These amendments and others 
compel the federal government to guarantee rights to all citizens. 
The fourteenth amendment compels states to grant these rights to 
their citizens. 
First Amendment Claims. Many Section 1983 claims originate 
from an alleged deprivation of a first amendment freedom. For 
example, religious groups have been found to have the right to 
distribute literature and solicit funds on state or municipal property 
CO 
under certain circumstances. A federal court in Goetz v. Ansel! 
held that children could remain seated while their classmates partici-
59 pated iri the pledge of allegiance. Cooper v. Pates provided one 
could not be discriminated against on the basis of a particular 
religious preference. 
Possibly the broadest use of Section 1983 as it relates to the 
first amendment is in the area of freedom of speech and expression. 
Pickering v. Board of Education^ dealt with a teacher, who the 
Supreme Court found, was wrongfully discharged for an application of 
this constitutionally protected freedom. In Pickering, the Court 
established a balance test to determine if an employee's speech was 
58477 F. 2d 636, (2nd Cir. 1973). 
59382 F. 2d 518, (7th Cir. 1967). 
60391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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protected by the Constitution. The Court stated: 
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between 
the interest of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
on matters of a public concern, and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficacy of the 
public service it performs through its employees. 
Public school students in Butt v. Dallas Independent School 
C O  
Pistrict were allowed to wear black armbands that expressed their 
political sentiment against the Viet Nam War. The Court ruled that 
this freedom of expression, as long as it did not create a significant 
educational disruption, was protected under the first amendment. 
CO 
At issue in the 1958 case, NAACP v. Alabama was the question 
of whether a state could force the NAACP to divulge a list of names 
and addresses of members of the NAACP without regard to their position 
C.A 
in the organization. In a similar 1946 case, Marsh v. Alabama 
the Supreme Court stated: 
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more 
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use 
by the public in general, the more do his rights become 
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights 
of those who use it.°5 
falId. at 568. 
62436 F. 2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971). 
63Supra. 
*^326 U.S. 501 (1946). This case centered on the legality of 
a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses distributing religious literature 
on the streets of a town. The town was a company town and was 
completely owned by a private corporation. 
65Id. at 506. 
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The first amendment right of association also enjoys consider­
able protection un 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In a series of cases, 
federal courts have ruled that membership in organizations for politi­
cal, professional or personal reasons in itself should not bar a 
person from employment. 
Fourth Amendment Claims Based on Section 1983. Section 1983 
provides remedies against wrongful arrest, privacy, and search and 
seizure. These claims often arise against individuals performing 
police or prison guard functions. However, there have been several 
cases involving fourth amendment claims made by students. Possibly 
fifi 
the most recent case was New Jersey v. TLO. These and similar 
cases center on the issue of the degree of freedom that public school 
students enjoy from searches made either on their person or of their 
possessions by school officials. 
Eighth Amendment Claims Based on Section 1983. The eighth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, with its provision 
against "cruel and unusual punishment," has had numerous claims 
litigated based on Section 1983. Most of these claims have been 
brought by persons incarcerated in either jails or penal institutions. 
There have been some claims based on the eighth amendment brought by 
public school students or their parents against school personnel 
for inflicting either unusual physical or mental punishment on 
students. 
66105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
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5. Immunities From Section 1983 Action. Through an inter­
pretation of the eleventh amendment states are immune from private 
actions against them. Several courts have, from that immunity, 
broadened it to include certain state agencies. State universities 
have tended to rely on the immunity of the eleventh amendment to 
shield them from suits for claims based on alleged personnel dis-
67 
crimination. 
go 
In Scheur v. Rhodes the Supreme Court ruled that "official" 
immunity apparently rested on two mutually dependent rationales: 
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith of sub­
jecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal 
obligation of his position to exercise discretion, and (2) the danger 
that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to 
execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required 
69 by the public good. 
There are two types of immunities available which protect 
individuals from prosecution. These immunities are absolute immunity 
and qualified immunity. Immunities against prosecution from a 
Section 1983 violation, have been created by the federal courts and 
67Martha M. McCarthy, Discrimination in Public Employment: The 
Evolving Law. National Organization on Legal Problems of Education: 
Topeka, Kansas, 1983, p. 58. 
68416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
69Id. at 240. 
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not by Congress. Courts have based their reasons for creating 
immunity on: 
(1) The danger of influencing public officials by threat of 
a law suit, (2) the deterrent effect of potential liability 
on men who are considering entering public life, (3) the 
drain on the valuable time of the official caused by insub­
stantial suits, (4) the unfairness of subjecting officials 
to liability for the acts of their subordinates, (5) the 
theory that the official owes a duty to the public and not 
to the individual, and (6) the feeling that the ballot and 
the formal removal proceedings are more appropriate ways 
to enforce honesty and efficiency of public workers.'0 
Absolute immunity was created by the courts for judges and 
those working directly under their authority (e.g., prosecuting 
attorneys, bailiffs, etc.).^ The immunity exists as long as judges 
and their subordinates, including legislators and prosecutors, act 
within their jurisdiction. They lose all immunity when an act is in 
excess of their jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, as well as inferior 
courts, has ruled that absolute immunity does not exist for injunc­
tive or declaratory relief. 
Certain groups enjoy what is known as qualified immunity. 
Qualified immunity has been granted to certain groups in part because 
they perform what the Court stated were "quasi-judicial" activities. 
Qualified immunity was created by the courts as a balance between 
preventing and compensating for constitutional violations and avoiding 
the overdeterrence of decision-making by government officials. 
^Federal Civil Rights Acts, p. 182. 
^The following cases further explain the immunities provided 
for the groups of people listed above: Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 
547 (1967), Maritone v. McKeithen, 413 F. 2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1969), 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
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Qualified immunity has been granted to many governmental officials 
including school officials, police officers, government officials, 
72 . 73 and others. School districts do not enjoy qualified immunity. 
6. Remedies for Violations Based on Section 1983. Section 
1983 provides that an individual who successfully proves that his 
civil rights' were abridged is entitled to damages for those abridged 
74 rights. The amount of damages awarded can either be nominal, where 
the individual fails to prove a significant financial or emotional 
loss; compensatory, designed to compensate the victim for mental or 
emotional distress and damages done that impaired the reputation of 
the plaintiff; punitive or exemplary, which are designed to make it 
75 clear that the deprivations of certain rights should end. 
A federal judge, in his decision, stated: 
Whether or not actual compensatory damage is present, a 
plaintiff is an action under 42 USC Section 1983 may also 
recover nominal damages because the constitutional rights 
of a citizen are so valuable to him that an injury is 
72Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), Pierson v. Ray, 
386 U.S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), 
among others. 
73 Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper, 611 F. 2d 
1109 (5th Cir. 1980). 
74A Section 1983 plaintiff does not have to exhaust state 
remedies prior to entering federal court. Patsy v. Board of Regents 
of Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982). 
^Kelly Frels, "Punitive Damages in Civil Rights Actions." 
Thomas Jones and Darel Semler, ed. School Law Update, 1985. National 
organization on Legal Problems in Education: Topeka: Kansas, 1985. 
36 
presumed to flow from the deprivation itself. In most cases 
when a public official denies rights that the citizen felt 
were secure under our Constitution, the result is hurt 76 
feelings, outrage, embarrassment or humiliation . . . . 
77 The Supreme Court, in Carey v. Piphus, stated that damages 
must be proven to have occurred in order for a plaintiff to gain any 
damages other than nominal ones. In Carey, a case that was consoli­
dated out of two separate suits, the Court stated a plaintiff must 
show actual injury before he can collect anything more than one 
dollar. A jury is not obligated to award nominal damages to the 
plaintiff/** 
During the course of litigation of Section 1983 claims that 
arise from an alleged unjust dismissal, a court must determine if the 
plaintiff has a liberty or a property interest to continued employ­
ment. 
The Constitution's eleventh amendment prohibits citizens from 
bringing suit against the individual states. The Supreme Court ruled 
in 1981 that punitive damages were not available to plaintiffs 
bringing suit against municipalities and other governmental bodies or 
79 their employees when sued in their official capacities. 
^United States ex rel. Moteley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807 
(E.D. Pa., 1972). 
77435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
78Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F. 2d 337 (4th Cir. 1985). 
79City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, (1981). 
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In 1976 Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award 
80 Act. Attorney's fees may now be awarded to the prevailing party in 
a Section 1983 action. As a rule attorney's fees are not awarded to 
the prevailing defendant unless the suit brought by the plaintiff 
81 was "unreasonable, frivolous, or completely meritless." The deci­
sion in awarding attorney's fees in litigation involving Section 1983 
82 is left to the discretion of the federal courts. 
First Amendment Rights - Freedom of Speech 
The framers of the United States Constitution did not initially 
include a list of rights or freedoms. The convention delegates did 
not think that individual rights were in danger and that they would 
be protected by their individual states. However, the absence of a 
bill of rights became the strongest objection to the ratification of 
the Constitution. Many feared that the states would not ratify the 
Constitution and, consequently, there was the general demand for 
written guarantees of individual freedom. James Madison, with the 
help of others, thus wrote the first ten amendments to the Constitu­
tion. The first amendment of the Bill of Rights states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: or 
^42 U.S.C. Section 1988. The section states:". . . the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonably attorney's fee as part of the costs." 
81 Discrimination in Public Employment: The Evolving Law, p. 58. 
QO 
"Legal Issues in Public School Employment," p. 93. 
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti­
tion the government for a redress of grievances.83 
Free speech and expression are essential for one to gain 
knowledge in order to make rational and intelligent decisions. 
Freedom of expression is an essential process in an advanced society. 
It is an absolute necessity if man is to reach his individual self-
fulfillment. People cannot be free if their minds are not free to 
investigate, to explore and to question. By allowing individuals to 
make suggestions, to ask questions, to understand the critical issues 
facing them, freedom of expression helps a country by providing a 
framework where citizens can experience intellectual growth. Politi­
cal beliefs can change and culture can expand without destroying 
84 society. On this point Justice Brandels wrote: 
Those who won our independence believed that freedom to 
think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
trugh: that without free speech and assembly, discus­
sion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination 
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be fundamental principle of 
the American government.85 
Since the American society is inhabited with millions of 
people, all freedoms including speech are, to a degree, limited. The 
adage that states, "our freedoms end where another's begins" is true. 
83 United States Constitution. Amendment I, Section I. 
84 s ' Thomas L. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression. 
Random House: New York, 1970, p. 7! 
OC 
The First Freedoms Today, p. 8. 
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ConCongress and the Supreme Court recognized the hazards of absolute 
freedom of speech early in the nation's history. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of speech 
such as obscenity, "fighting words" and defamation are not protected 
by the first amendment. It has likewise held that the first amend­
ment does not bar government from imposing reasonable time, place 
87 and manner restrictions on speech. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
established the principle that freedom of speech could be restricted 
QQ 
under special circumstances in Schenck v. United States. The Court 
stated that those circumstances were those which created a "clear and 
present danger." These restrictions on speech could apply when other 
freedoms such as public safety, established government, national 
89 security and private property were in danger. Justice Holmes in 
his opinion stated: 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would 
have been within their constitutional rights. But the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in 
which it is done. The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire 
in a theater and causing a panic. It does not even protect 
a man from injunction against uttering words that may have 
all the effect of force. The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and 
86Schenck v. United States, 297 U.S. 47, (1919). 
87 George Rogister, Ann Majestic and Stephen Lindsay, "Recent 
Developments in First Amendment Law: Narrowing the Scope of 
Constitutional Protection." North Carolina Leadership for Principals. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, June 1984, p. 1. 
88c Supra. 
89Id. at 52. 
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are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things 
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so 
long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as 
protected by any constitutional rights.90 
In their decisions involving freedom of speech, federal courts 
have often reflected the mood of the country. The Bill of Rights had 
been in existence less than ten years when the freedoms granted by 
the first amendment were challenged. Because war with France looked 
imminent Congress, in 1798, passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
These acts limited the first amendment freedoms of citizens either 
to speak or to publish articles that would cast a bad light on either 
the government or government officials. The Sedition Act of 1798 
stated: 
If any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any 
false, scandalous and malicious writings against the govern­
ment of the United States, or either house of the Congress 
of the United States, or the President of the United States, 
with intent to defame the said government, or either house 
of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring 
them or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to 
excite against them or either of any of them, the hatred of 
the good people of the United States or to stir up sedition 
within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combina­
tion therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United 
States, or any act of the President of the United States, 
done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him 
vested by the Constitution of the United States, or to 
resist, oppose or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, 
encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation 
against the United States, their people or government, then 
90Id. at 53. 
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such person, being thereof convicted before any court of 
the United States having jurisdiction therfeof, shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and 
by imprisonment not exceeding two years.91 
The Alien and Sedition Laws became one of the major issues of 
the presidential election of 1800. On being elected President, Thomas 
Jefferson promptly pardoned all those convicted under the Alien and 
Sedition Laws. Congress then passed laws remitting all fines. The 
92 laws were allowed to expire the following year. 
President Andrew Jackson in 1835 proposed an attack on the 
first amendment. Jackson invited Congress to enact legislation that 
would prohibit the use of the mails for "incendiary publications 
intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection." Congress refused 
to enact this legislation citing that it was in conflict with the 
93 first amendment. 
In the period following World War I, the Supreme Court in 
Qd QG, 
Abrams v. U.S. and Gitlow v. People of the State of New York 
adopted the standard of a "dangerous tendency in order to curb radical 
speaking rights." In 1920 some five hundred FBI agents and local 
Alien and Sedition Act. 
92 The First Freedoms Today, p. 6. 
93Ibid. 
94250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
95268 U.S. 652 (1924). In this case the Court stated, "It is 
a fundamental principle, that the freedom of speech and of the press 
which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute 
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may 
chose ..." (at 667). 
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police, without the benefit of arrest or search warrants, entered the 
homes of approximately three thousand Russian, Finish, Polish, German, 
Italian and other alien workmen, looking for Communist party members 
96 to deport. This type of abridgment of first amendment rights was 
repeated in the 1950s with the "Red Scare" during the tenure of 
Senator Joseph McCarthy as Chairman of the Senate Permanent Sub­
committee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations. 
Senator McCarthy convinced millions of Americans that the government 
was infiltrated by Communist agents. As a result, books were burned, 
libraries were closed and people, accused of having sympathies with 
97 the Communists, were dismissed from their jobs. It was during this 
period that many school systems, as well as other employers, began 
to require loyalty oaths as a condition of employment. 
The Supreme Court in 1974 reversed the trend of the 1950s with 
its decision in Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcombe, Governor of 
go 
Indiana. The Court ruled invalid an Indiana law that restricted 
the political expression of the Communist party of that state. 
96The First Freedoms Today, p. 5. Also, Joseph E. Bryson and 
Elizabeth W. Petty, Censorship of Public School Library and Instruc­
tional Materials. Michie Company: Charlottesville, Va., 1982. 
97Ibid., p. 7. 
9®414 U.S. 441, rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974). 
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Teacher Freedom of Speech 
Public school teachers, as all other citizens of the United 
States, are auaranteed the right by the Constitution to speak freely. 
The Supreme Court has held that teachers cannot be disciplined for 
exercising their free speech rights as protected by the United States 
99 
Constitution. Yet, this has not always been the practice. Since 
the Civil War period, teachers have been faced with restrictions both 
on speech and certain other behaviors that were accepted by other 
professions. 
Over the years there has been a dramatic shift in community 
perceptions toward teachers. American teachers are now abler to enjoy 
the same freedoms, including speech, that other professions have. 
This has been brought about to a large degree by cultural develop­
ments in the United States such as the demographic shift to urban 
centers of population, the influence of the press and other media, 
the development of teacher organizations and an increase in the 
militancy of teachers.100 
There has also been a dramatic shift in the amount of freedom 
granted by the courts to teachers. Both state and federal courts have 
continued to expand personal and professional freedoms of America's 
public school teachers. The following are selected cases dealing with 
99 Chester Nolte, "Teachers May Communicate Directly with 
School Boards on Matters of Public Concern." West's Education Law 
Reporter. Vol. 30, No. 3, May 1, 1987, p. 448" See also Pickering 
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
100Louis Fischer and David Schimmel, The Civil Rights of 
Teachers. Harper and Row: New York, 1973, p. 3. 
44 
freedom of speech as it related chiefly to public school teachers. 
Two cases are presented which do not directly involve the application 
of the first amendment guarantee of free speech to teachers. The two 
cases are presented here since the opinions of the courts have a 
direct bearing on all occupations, including teaching. These cases 
are presented sequentially, thereby highlighting the increased amount 
of freedom of speech allowed by state and federal courts through 
their decisions. 
Membership in the Communist party was the issue in Board of 
Education of Eureka v. Jewett.101 Jewett, a California social studies 
teacher, was dismissed from his job for refusing to deny that he was 
a Communist. Additionally, he made statements such as: "It was silly 
and foolish to salute the American flag." and "Russia had the best 
government in the world." The court in holding for the board of 
education stated: 
By section 5.544 of the School Code, the people of California 
speaking through the legislature, make it the duty of all 
teachers to endeavor to impress upon the minds of the 
pupils the principles of patriotism, and to train them up 
to a true comprehension of the duties and dignity of American 
citizenship .... The preservation of our nation depends 
on the patriotism of its people. Our School Code gives 
recognition to the principle that patriotism is to be instilled 
in the pupils attending our public schools. This purpose is 
not accomplished by the retention on our teaching staffs of 
instructors who entertain the beliefs held by the appellant, 
and sho seek to impress those beliefs upon their pupils.'02 
10168 P. 2d 404 (1937). 
102Id. at 407. 
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Although Frost Trucking Company v. Railroad Commission of 
103 
California, decided in 1926, did not directly involve the public 
schools, it is relevant to this subject since the United States 
Supreme Court spoke to the issue of job related rights. In Frost 
the Court stated: 
It would be palpable incongruity to strike down an act 
of state legislation which, by words of express divest­
ment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed 
by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by 
which the same result is accomplished under the guise 
of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable 
privilege which the state threatens otherwise to with­
hold. If the state may compel the surrender of one 
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it 
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is 
inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Consti­
tution of the United States may thus be manipulated 
out of existence.10^ 
105 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Appeal of Albert, dealt 
with the dismissal of an experienced teacher for her participation 
in what was called un-American or subversive doctrines. Albert was 
exposed by an undercover F.B.I agent who stated that she attended 
meetings of the Comnunist party. No evidence was presented by the 
board of education in her suit that stated that she ever exposed her 
students to either her political philosophy or to written teachings 
concerning the Communist party. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
103271 U.S. 583 (1926). 
104Id. at 594. 
10592 A. 2d 663 (Pa. 1952). 
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in its opinion, stated: 
Miss Albert is not being penalized in her capacity as a 
private citizen because of any political, economic or 
social view she may entertain or any expression she may 
care to give to those views. The concern here is with 
her rights as a teacher, and the legislature can 
certainly prescribe qualifications for teachers in the 
public schools with respect not only to their academic 
attainments, but also to their moral character and,06 
their loyalty to the state and federal government. 
In 1949 the New York legislature passed the Feinberg Law which 
made membership in a subversive organization prima facie evidence of 
disqualification for appointment or retention in the public schools 
of the state.^ It further directed local boards of education to 
108 file reports on the loyalty of all teachers. Adler v. Board of 
109 Education of the City of New York dealt with the constitutionality 
of that law. Adler, a New York teacher, was fired from his teaching 
position for his membership in what the state cited as a subversive 
organization. On appeal to the Supreme Court in a six-to-three 
decision, the Court concluded that the Feinberg Law was constitu­
tional . Justice Minton, writing for the majority, stated: 
It is clear that citizens have the right under our law to 
assemble, speak, think, and believe as they will. It is 
106Id. at 665. 
^Education Law, Section 3021, Civil Service Law, Section 
105, McKinney's Consol. Laws, C. 16, (section 3022) 1967. 
108 Edmund Reutter, Jr., The Law of Public Education. The 
Foundation Press, Inc., 1985, p. 531. 
109342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
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equally clear that they have no right to work for the state 
in the school system on their own terms. They may work for 
the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by 
the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose 
to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their 
beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the state 
thus deprived them of any right to free speech or assembly? 
We think not . . . One's associates, past and present, as 
well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in 
determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial, one's 
reputation has been determined in party by the company he 
keeps. In the employment of officials and teachers of the 
school system, the state may very properly inquire into the 
company they keep, and we know of no rule, constitutional 
or otherwise, that prevents the state, when determining the 
fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the 
organizations and person with whom they associate.!10 
The three dissenting justices each wrote opinions in the Adler 
decision. Justice Douglas wrote: 
I cannot find in our constitutional scheme the power of a 
state to place its employees in the category of second-class 
citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression. 
The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expres­
sion to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; 
and none needs it more than the teacher. We need to be bold 
and adventuresome in our thinking to survive. A school 
system producing students trained as robots threatens to rob 
a generation of the versatility that has been perhaps our 
greatest distinction. The Framers knew the danger of dogma­
tism; they also knew the strength that comes when the mind 
is free, when ideas may be pursued wherever they lead. We 
forget these teachings of the First Amendment when we sustain 
this law. The guilt of the teacher should turn on overt 
acts. So long as she is a law-abiding citizen, so long as 
her performance within the public school system meets pro­
fessional standards, her private life, her political 
philosophy, her social creed should not be the cause of 
reprisals against herjll 
110Id.. at 492. 
]11Id. at 511. 
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In 1967 a majority of the Supreme Court reversed Adler with its 
np 
opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Reagents of New York. Because 
Keyishian refused tosign a certificate stating that he was not a 
Communist, his contract was not renewed. The Supreme Court held 
that mere membership in an organization without specific intent to 
further the unlawful aims of the organization was not a constitu-
113 tionally adequate basis for failure to renew Keyishian's contract. 
Possibly the most famous case dealing with freedom of speech 
for teachers was Pickering v. Board of Education,^4 decided in 1968. 
Pickering, a high school teacher, was employed by the Will County, 
Illinois, Board of Education. He was dismissed from his position 
for sending a letter to the local newspaper to be published under 
the editorial section. In his letter, Pickering attacked both the 
superintendent and the board of education for their handling of a 
bond referendum that failed and for what he considered to be an 
excessive amount of emphasis placed on athletics. He further hinted 
that other teachers had been prevented from criticizing the proposed 
bond issue. Following the publication of the letter, the Will County 
Board of Education voted for his dismissal. 
112385 U.S. 589, (1967). 
113 The Court wrote: The theory that public employment which 
may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regard­
less of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected, (at 605 S. 
Ct.). 
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At the dismissal hearing the board stated that Pickering's 
statements impugned the "motives, honesty, integrity, trughfulness, 
responsibility and competence of both the board of education and the 
district's administration." The board further charged that the alle­
gations made by Pickering damaged the professional reputations of 
individual board members, "would create a significant disruption to 
faculty discipline," and would tend to forment "controversy, conflict 
and dissension among teachers, administrators, the board and residents 
of the district. 
In the decision, delivered by Justice Marshall, the Court 
immediately dismissed the board's allegations that its individual 
reputations were damaged by the charges made in Pickering's letter. 
The Court stated that the letter was "greeted by everyone but its 
main target, the board, with massive apathy and total disbelief." 
The Court continued by stating that since both attempts at raising 
revenues for the schools through bond referendums had failed and since 
there was no evidence presented that another referendum was planned, 
Pickering's letter did not, in fact, damage the board's ability to 
raise revenues for the school. The board's charges that Pickering 
had spread false information concerning the budget of the school 
system were also dismissed. It was noted that the board dould very 
easily have published the correct information if it had chosen to 
115Id. at 571. 
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do so. The Court stated: 
What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher has 
made erroneous public statements upon issues then currently 
the subject of public attention, which are critical of his 
ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be 
presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher's 
proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or 
to have interfered with the regular operation of the school 
generally. In these circumstances we conclude that the 
interest of the school administration in limiting teachers' 
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not similar 
contribution by any member of the general public.116 
In 1977 the Supreme Court decided the case, Mt. Healthy City 
117 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle. Doyle filed suit 
after he was dismissed by the Mt. Healthy, Ohio, Board of Education. 
Doyle, a nontenured teacher, was dismissed for what the board charged 
was a "notable lack of tact in handling professional matters which 
leaves much doubt as to your (Doyle's) sincerity in establishing good 
school relationships. 
Doyle had been involved in several incidents both with students 
where he had used vulgar hand gestures and with faculty and staff 
members. In addition, Doyle had telephoned the local radio station 
and had given the station information concerning a proposed teacher 
dress policy. The district court found that the call to the radio 
was "clearly protected by the first amendment," and because it had 
played a major part in the board's decision not to rehire him, the 
116Id. at 573. 
117429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
118Id. at 281. 
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court ruled for reinstatement and awarded backpay. The court of 
I 1 Q 
appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion. 
The Supreme Court, in a decision handed down by Justice 
Rehnquist, stated that the absence of tenure was not a factor in the 
decision in that the board's decision not to rehire Doyle was based 
on the exercise of his constitutionally protected first amendment 
freedom. The Court was concerned as to how the district court and 
the court of appeals decided that Doyle's dismissal was substantially 
a result of the telephone call to the radio station. It agreed that 
the call was a protected freedom of the first amendment but doubted 
that it was necessarily the "substantial part" of the decision in 
the nonrenewal of Doyle's contract. The Court suggested a three-
part test. Under the test the burden of proof was placed on the 
employee to show first that his or her conduct was constitutionally 
protected and second, that the conduct was a substantial or motivat­
ing factor in the board's decision. In the third part of the test 
the employer must then show that it would have reached the same 
employment decision had the constitutionally protected expression not 
have occurred. As such, the Court ordered that the opinion of the 
court of appeals be vacated and that the case be remanded for further 
proceedings.^20 
119Id_. at 284. 
120Id. at 287. 
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The next important case dealing with a teacher's freedom of 
121 speech was Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District 
decided in 1979. The case dealt with a teacher, Givhan, a black 
woman, who had been dismissed from her employment at the end of the 
school year because of a series of private conversations with her 
principal. The school district introduced evidence that the conver­
sations tended to be made up of petty unreasonable demands, and the 
122 tone of them was "insulting, hostile, loud and arrogant. The 
district court found for Givhan stating that her dismissal was in 
violation of the first amendment granting her freedom of speech. 
The Court of Appeals for tye Fifth Circuit reversed on the basis 
that Givhan's complaints were made in private conversations and, as 
123 such, were not protected by the first amendment. 
In the decision written by Justice Rehnquist that reversed the 
court of appeals, the Court stated: 
The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the "freedom of 
speech." Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions 
indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee 
who arranges to communicate privately with his employer 
rather than to spread his view before the public. We 
decline to adopt such a view of the First Amendment.!24 
125 The final case discussed in this section, Connick v. Myers 
decided in 1982, is not one involving teacher freedom of speech. It 
121555 F. 2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977). 
122Id. at 1311. 
123Id. at 1314. 
124439 U.S. 410 (1977) at 416. 
125461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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is discussed here as it involves Section 1983 and is the Supreme 
Court's most recent case involving free speech. 
Connick v. Myers involved Assistant District Attorney Sheila 
Myers who was fired from her job for passing around a questionnaire 
about confidence in superordinates and office morale to fifteen other 
attorneys in her office after being notified of her transfer to 
another section of criminal court. Myers wrote and distributed 
questionnaires at the office, both during a coffee break and during 
1 
regular office working hours. In a meeting, Myers was terminated 
for her refusal to accept the transfer and her distribution of the 
127 survey, which Connick considered to be an act of insubordination. 
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court first considered the 
issues of office morale, confidence, and grievance policies. The 
Court stated that some subject matter is "inherently of public con­
cern" regardless of its context. The Court found that the survey was 
designed to gather opinion, not to disseminate it. Finally, the Court 
decided that the audience of the survey was Myers's co-workers, not 
the general public. In considering the facts of the case, the Court 
decided that there was not public speech concern involved in the case 
1 
The questionnaire consisted of fourteen questions including 
the following; (1) From your experience, do you feel office procedure 
regarding transfers has been fair?, (2) Do you have confidence in 
and would you rely on the word of (names of five superiors)?, (3) Do 
you. ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of 
office supported candidates?, and (4) How would you rate office 
morale? (103 S. Ct. 1684 at 1694). 
127Id. at 141. 
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other than the one question regarding political campaigns and that 
the potential harmful effects of Myers's survey outweighed her free 
speech rights.^28 
128Id. at 154. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF CASES INVOLVING 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 
AND AN ALLEGED ABRIDGMENT OF THE FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH ON PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS 
Teachers, as all citizens, enjoy rights granted to them by 
the Constitution. Theses rights are, however, not absolute and 
unlimited. Although the mere acceptance of public school employment 
does not by itself strip one of any constitutional rights, including 
the right of free speech, courts have held that the rights of the 
individual teacher must be weighed against the school system's 
interest in providing education. As a result, the activities of 
teachers both during school and after school hours must be balanced 
between the rights of teachers to live their lives as they choose and 
the public's interest in promoting the learning process. A majority 
of cases where public school teachers challenge their nonpromotion 
or dismissal are based upon a denial of the right of freedom of 
speech. 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 has become the chief vehicle for 
teachers bringing first amendment claims into federal courts. 
Litigation involving freedom of speech for teachers can be 
broken into several different segments: (1) out-of-class speech, in 
both spoken and written form, (2) classroom speech involving academic 
freedom, (3) the personal appearance of teachers, (4) the private 
lives of teachers, and (5) the political activity of teachers. 
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Although all areas of teacher speech will be covered, the emphasis 
in this chapter will be on out-of-class speech by teachers, either in 
spoken or written form that is critical of a superordinate since 
this appears to have produced the major portion of litigation involv­
ing public school teachers. 
Verbal Criticisms and Threats Made 
on a Superordinate 
129 130 Courts have, since Givhan and Pickering, generally 
accepted limited criticisms by teachers of the school administration 
provided that the subject of the criticism was not limited to private 
matters but rather reflected issues of public concern. Yet courts 
have rejected the appeals concerning adverse employment decisions 
made by boards when the affected teacher has made threats on his 
superordinate. This section will be divided into cases litigated 
because of public verbal criticisms of school administrators and 
litigation based on threats made by public school teachers on their 
superordinates. 
Verbal Criticisms. The Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of 
131 Education wrote that from its decision "more specific rules (would 
be developed) that would leave both sides with a clearer understanding 
129439 U.S. 410, (1970). 
130391 U.S. 563, (1968). 
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132 of their rights and responsibilities." State and federal courts 
have continued to expand Pickering along with other landmark free 
speech cases such as Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School 
District,133 Mt. Healthy v. Doyle J34 and Connick v. Myers135 to 
separate the rights of teachers and their portected use of the first 
amendment from the rights of their employers in promoting the 
efficient and successful operation of the public school. 
It is balancing the rights of teachers to speak on issues of 
public concern and the rights of boards of education to provide 
orderly instruction that often create uncertainties as to how much 
freedom of speech a teacher or a board of education possesses. In 
1 
Irby v. McGowan a nontenured teachers whose contract was not 
renewed sought to enjoin an Alabama board of education from denying 
her another contract. Irby contended that her nonrenewal was based 
on her criticisms concerning social promotion and the federally funded 
pilot project for which she was employed. Irby also challenged the 
board's entry of "Fairhope-Mrs. Paula Irby-Dismissed Noncooperative" 
into its official record of minutes concerning her nonrenewal. 
132Id. at 574. 
133Supra. 
134429 U.S. 274, (1977). 
135461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
136380 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Alabama, 1974). 
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The court in Irby summarized the balancing of first amendment 
rights of teachers and boards of education. The district court wrote: 
Let there be no mistake, it is this court's opinion that 
a teacher has a right to express her views with reference 
to such things as excessive and cumbersome paperwork, the 
validity or invalidity of "Social Passing," the evaluation 
of school programs, including the pilot program which the 
defendants were anxious to see succeed, ets. "Unity," 
"support," "oneness" should not be achieved by silence, 
blind obedience, or apathy. On the other hand, while all 
must be given an opportunity to be heard, for an orderly 
and intelligent administration of any program time 
necessarily must be limited in which debate can be had, 
then decisions must be made and foil owed J 37 
Two things that often separate verbal and written criticisma 
are the context and manner in which the criticism was given. Often 
statements that are made in anger are abrasive and cause a permanent 
rift between employee and employer. A federal district court in its 
138 decision in Jones v. Battles stated: 
The plaintiff's abusive language directed toward his 
nominal superior, was of such a nature as to destroy any 
likelihood of a future amiable professional relationship 
between his and the administrative staff . . . The 
plaintiff's reckless unsupported and subjective accusa­
tions plant the seeds of disruptive dissension among the 
many. The standards of professional conduct expected of 
a public school teacher must never be lowered to the 
level of name-calling and abuse under the guise of pro­
tected free speech. If this was condoned and permitted 
to occur, it would invite chaos, bitterness and a general 
loss of morale in all facets of public service.139 
137Id. at 1030. 
138315 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1970). 
139Id. at 604. 
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In Jones a teacher had appeared at an open board forum and 
stated the following about the Director of Secondary Education: 
I questioned his ability, obviously, questioned his 
honesty without a doubt. I wonder if what he did to me 
is a pattern. I wonder in other words, to speak with 
candor ... I wonder if Doctor Barry is Simply a liar 
or if Doctor Barry is simply a bad liar?140 
The superintendent had requested Jones to write a latter of 
apology for his remarks made at the public forum. Jones refused to 
apologize and was notified that his contract would not be renewed. 
Jones unsuccessfully sought an injunction to prevent his contract 
from being nonrenewed. 
In Gahr v. Trammel^ a teacher not only criticized his super­
intendent but also accused him and other administrators of criminal 
misconduct, theft of school property. The facts in Gahr were that 
Superintendent McFatridge, upon hearing complaints from students that 
they were not learning in Gahr's classroom, decided to investigate 
the complaints. During the course of the investigation, the superin­
tendent discovered that Gahr had made statements that the superin­
tendent and other members of the school system were stealing food 
from the cafeteria. Gahr was suspended with pay during an investiga­
tion and was later informed that he was to be dismissed at the end of 
the school year. In his letter of dismissal to Gahr, McFatridge 
stated that the school system "could not tolerate unfounded 
140Id. at 604. 
141796 F. 2d 1063 (8th. Cir. 1986). 
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accusations being made in the community by you which reflect upon 
14? 
the integrity of school personnel." The Eighth Circuit, in 
affirming the district court's decision, held that Gahr's first 
amendment claim had already been litigated in the Arkansas courts 
143 
and under res judicata Gahr could not appeal the state court's 
decision by bringing it into federal court. 
On the basis of the Pickering decision, even public employees 
who make critical remarks concerning their employers on issues of 
public concern are not completely insulated. The Court in Pickering 
recognized that considerations must be accorded to the "state as 
employer, im promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
144 performs through its employees." The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in Patterson v. Masem^45 denied the ppeal of a teacher 
who was passed over for promotion to a supervisory position because 
of her leadership of a group of protestors. Ruth Patterson had been 
assigned to mediate a controversy concerning the high school produc­
tion of the play, "You Can't Take It With You." Patterson agreed with 
a group of parents and citizens that the language of the play was 
racially insulting and asked that the play be cancelled. Later she 
142Id. at 1065. 
143 
Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1738, federal courts must give the 
same preclusive effect to state court judgments in Section 1983 
actions as the judgments would receive in the courts of the rendering 
state. 
144IcU at 568. 
145774 F. 2d 251 (8th. Cir. 1985). 
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was passed over for promotion to a higher supervisory position and 
claimed that the basis of the board's decision was her objection to 
the play's performance. In finding for the board, the court held that 
the board's reaction to Patterson was not the position which she took 
but was rather directed at her inability to mediate between the 
groups. The court stated: 
Here a play was selected by the school district ... it 
was Dr. Patterson's duty to respect the district's choice. 
While her conduct did indeed address a matter of public 
concern, it also interfered with the proper performance of 
her job. We cannot find that the district court erred in 
its conclusion that the incident could have raised questions 
regarding Dr. Patterson's willingness to follow her superiors' 
directives as to curriculum and as to whether a person with 
Dr. Patterson's propensities toward censorship and bowderism 
should supervise the teaching of literature and hi story J 46 
An employee must do more than simply claim an abridgment of a 
first amendment right. He must also prove that his or her speech was 
protected and that it was the motivating reason for the board's 
adverse employment decision. This being done, the board of education 
must then show that it would have reached the same employment decision 
regardless of the employee's speech. When an employee fails to show 
that his speech was constitutionally protected and that it was the 
reason for his superordinate's employment decisions, courts will deny 
relief as in the following two cases. 
Ronald Powers, a third-year teacher for the Montezuma County 
Colorado Board of Education, charged that his contract nonrenewal was 
146Id. at 257. 
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for his criticisms of the board, his candidacy for town mayor, his 
using the record "Jesus Christ Superstar," and his activities as 
president of the local teachers' association.^ The district court 
heard evidence on each of these charges and concluded that Powers 
failed to prove that any of his actions were the basis of his non-
148 renewal. In a similar case, Rocker v. Huntington, Ann Marie Rocker 
alleged that her dismissal was in retaliation for her complaints given 
at board meetings. She failed to prove that her dismissal was due to 
thfe exercise of her first amendment rights. Both the district court 
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pointed out that the 
board of education for which she was employed actually invited 
teachers to attend their meetings and encouraged their comments. 
149 Wichert v. Walter differs from the above cases in several 
important points. The facts in this case were that a teacher was 
notified of his transfer to a distant school for reasons that were 
widely considered to be political. Walter Wichert, who also served 
as mayor, attended a rally with some three hundred people in support 
of the transferred teacher. At the rally Wichert was asked by a 
147 Powers v. Mancos School District RE-6, Montezuma County, 
Colorado, 391 F. Supp. 322 (D.C. Colo. 1975). 
148550 F. 2d 804 (2nd. Cir. 1977). See also Brown v. Bullard 
Independent School District, 640 F. 2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981). 
149606 F. Supp. 1516 (D. N.J. 1985). See Swilley v. Alexander, 
629 F. 2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1980) where a teacher's comments concerning 
a principal were published in the local paper and Aebisher v. Ryan, 
622 F. 2d 651 where two teachers had reprimands placed in their 
personnel files for discussing a school disruption with the press. 
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reporter regarding his fellow teacher's transfer. Wichert responded, 
"It was one of the most ridiculous, stupid and obvious political moves 
150 
they have done." His comment was quoted the following day in the 
local paper. 
The next day the president of the board of education filed 
charges against Wichert which, if acted upon, would remove his tenure 
status. Walter, the president of the board, charged that Wichert had: 
Intentionally and with malice verbally assaulted the 
b o a r d  o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  t h a t  h e  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a n d  .  .  . w i t h  
a reckless disregard of the truth made false and or mis­
leading statements touching upon the daily operation of 
the school system by the Union City Board of Education 
with the intent of misleading the public on this issue 
. . . and that he intentiona-ly made derogatory, false and 
inaccurate statements, the truth of which could be easily 
ascertained.151 
The board president stated that these actions amounted to 
insubordination and misbehavior and demanded that the board and 
Wichert's tenure status and reduce his pay. Prior to any action of 
the board, Wichert requested that the federal court grant him prelimi­
nary relief, thus preventing the board of education from proceeding 
with its charges. 
In reviewing the facts of the case the district court immedi­
ately stated that from the evidence presented, it was clear that the 
150Id. at 1518. 
151Id. at 1518. 
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board of education which was to hear the tenure case bore the "taint 
of bias against the plaintiff" and because of that, the court was 
1 CO 
not barred from issuing the requested relief. 
There are several distinct points that should be noted in this 
particular case in light of the decisions of Pickering and Connick. 
First, unlike Connick's, Wichert's statements addressed matters of 
public concern. Second, Wichert's statements were made on his own 
time and not at his workplace as were Connick's. Finally, like 
Pickering's and unlike Connick's, Wichert's statements were addressed 
to the board of education for which he did not have a direct working 
relationship. 
In finding for Wichert the court spoke to the need for first 
amendment protection. The court wrote: 
What distinguishes a democratic state from a totalitarian 
one is the freedom to speak and criticize the government 
and its various agencies without fear of government 
retaliation. It is difficult to envision any right more 
fundamental to the establishment and continuation of a 
free society. To utilize something as vital as teaching 
assignments as a means of punishing or rewarding political 
activity would be reprehensive enough, but to then punish 
one who purports to disclose such activity would be even a 
greater evi1.153 
152 The school system argued that the court should be precluded 
from granting preliminary relief as that would create an unwarranted 
invasion of the administrative process by the court. The court 
refering to the Supreme Court decision of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37 (1971), held that "... In this case, the context in which the 
charges were brought, and their underlying lack of merit, convinces 
the court that they were brought only for the purpose of harassment 
and retaliation, with no hope of eventual success," at 1522. 
153Id. at 11517. 
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Some first amendment cases are not based on public criticisms 
of an employer but rather rest on whether public comments cast a doubt 
as to an employee's social fitness and the probability of future 
friction between employer and employee as in Anderson v. Evans.^ 
Anderson involved the dismissal of a teacher for "conduct unbecoming 
a teacher" and for "inefficiency." 
Evelyn Anderson, a white teacher, was employed in a predomi­
nantly black Tennessee school. After an incident involving her 
daughter, Anderson entered the principal's office and told both her 
black principal and assistant principal that she "hated all black 
155 folks." She further stated that she hoped that the police would 
catch a black person for assaulting her daughter even if they caught 
the wrong person. She concluded that she did not care even if the 
principal was wrongfully arrested and had to serve time for the 
incident as long as it was a black person. 
After that incident Anderson received a black teaching aide 
that she found unacceptable. She threatened Evans with a lawsuit if 
he did not remove the aide from the classroom. Anderson's contract 
was nonrenewed the following school year and Anderson received a due 
process hearing before the board of education. Anderson appealed 
the board's decision to nonrenew her contract to the district court 
which found for the board. Anderson appealed to the Court of Appeals 
154Id_. at 11517. 
155660 F. 2d 153 (6th. Cir. 1981). 
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for the Sixth Circuit alleging an abridgment of both the first and 
fourteenth amendments. 
In a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district 
court's decision. Th- court relied on Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and 
Givhan. The court wrote: 
Reading Pickering, Mt. Healthy and Givhan together leads to 
the conclusion that a two-step analysis may be required 
when a public employee alleges retaliation for the exercise 
of her constitutional right to freedom of speech. If the 
action of the employer is found to have had the effect of 
limiting the speech of an employee, a balance must be 
struck between the interest of the employee as an individual 
and the public interest served by the employer. If it is 
found that the interest of the state, as employer, in 
limiting the employee's freedom of expression is significantly 
greater than any interest it might have in similarly limit­
ing expression by a member of the general public, the public 
employer's action against its employee does not amount to 
a constitutional violation requiring remedial action.156 
The previously cited court decisions involving verbal criti­
cisms made to a superordinate in education indicate that it is 
preferable to insure a democratic system that educators express their 
differing views as opposed to maintaining blind obedience or silence. 
Nevertheless, certain guidelines must be followed to insure the 
on-going educational process: (1) the issue is of public concern; 
(2) the issue is not debated in the workplace (classroom) after a 
specified time period set aside for debate; (3) differences of opinion 
are addressed to the board of education and are expressed in a pro­
fessional manner to prevent loss of morale and the destruction of 
future professional relationships; (4) the manner in which an issue 
156Id. at 158. 
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of concern is addressed should not interfere with the proper per­
formance of one's duties; and (5) the educational system does not have 
the right to use teaching assignments as reinforcers of political 
activities. 
In summation, courts stress the importance of not disrupting 
the educational process while educators debate issues of public 
concern. Yet the courts also acknowledge the validity of internal 
disagreement as educational programs develop. The courts are saying 
that while there needs to be a time and place for all dissatisfied 
employees to express opposing viewpoints regarding issues of public 
concern, the ultimate decisions must rest with the board of education. 
Once such decisions are made, it is the professional duty of the 
employee to carry out the program. 
Threats Made on a Superordinate. Courts have agreed that 
threats of physical harm do not enjoy first amendment protections. 
157 The United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 
discussed the types of speech that do not enjoy the protections of 
the first amendment. The Court wrote: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. 
These include lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or "fighting" words - those which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
to an immediate breach of the peace J 58 
157315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
158Id. at 572. 
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Both White v. South Park Independent School District^ and 
160 
Amburgey v. Cassady involved physical threats made to superordi-
nates. In White, a Texas teacher and coach was dismissed for repeated 
threats to kill the school's athletic director and other members of 
the athletic department. White contended that at least part of the 
reasons for his dismissal were legitimate complaints he made concern­
ing the athletic department and the lack of supplies for it. The 
court of appeals agreed with the lower court that under Mt. Healthy 
the school board's termination was not unconstitutional in that 
although part of white's speech may have been constitutionally pro­
tected, the threats made to kill other employees were not. 
Like White, Amburgey v. Cassady involved both public criticisms 
and physical threats against a superordinate. . Grace Amburgey was 
notified that her contract was to be nonrenewed for six separate 
reasons including: threatening to shoot both the principal and 
superintendent, shoving the superintendent at a board meeting, and 
requesting, at a staff meeting, to be given the right to criticize the 
principal over the intercom system to all classrooms. As in White, 
Amburgey claimed that her actions were protected by the first amend­
ment. The court held that the board was correct in viewing all the 
complaints against Amburgey together and further that the incidents 
were not protected under first amendment guarantees. 
159693 F. 2d 1163 (5th. Cir. 1982). 
160370 F. Supp. 571 (E.D., Kentucky, 1974). 
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The paucity of cases involving threats to a superordinate 
obviously indicates that the first amendment does not protect threats 
that are obscene, libelous, or incite injury. 
Written Criticisms Against a Superordinate 
While written criticisms are usually not as inflamatory as are 
public criticisms and attacks against a superordinate, they often 
reach further than do public statements since they often appear in 
such media as the local paper and radio and television news. The 
following cases deal with employees who claimed adverse employment 
considerations because they exercised what they considered to be their 
protected first amendment rights in openly criticizing their 
employers. 
Written Letters to Newspapers, Legislators and Board Members. 
1 /• i 
In Zoll v, Eastern Allamakee Community School District, Rose Zoll, 
the former principal of the school where she then raught, wrote two 
letters to the local paper criticizing the school administration and 
board members about a decline in concern for academic excellence. 
The two letters were published during June and July. When school 
reconvened in the fall the principal called Zoll into his office where 
he expressed his displeasure with Zoll's criticisms. Zoll was termi­
nated at the close of the academic year based on the county's reduc­
tion in force (R.I.F.) policy. She had received the highest possible 
number of points in objective evaluation of experience and training 
161588 F. 2d 246 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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but received fewer points than other teachers in the subjective 
evaluations by the principal, superintendent and school board. The 
following year the board hired two new teachers and transferred 
another teacher to three vacancies that Zoll was certified for, in 
open violation of the R.I.F. policy. Zoll successfully brought suit 
in federal district court alleging that her termination was based on 
her written criticisms of the administration. In finding for Zoll 
the jury awarded her the maximum permissible damages to Zoll against 
the school principal and superintendent. The court ordered that Zoll 
be offered the next available teaching position but limited recom-
pensation for her attorney's fees. 
The principal and superintendent appealed the district court's 
decision and Zoll cross-appealed the decision limiting the award of 
attorney's fees, the instructions to the jury concerning the "rights 
of free speech," and the decision not to extend the back pay period 
of the date of offered reinstatement. The court of appeals affirmed 
the entry of judgment against the principal and superintendent and 
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration as to 
the back pay period and the award of attorney's fees. 
Once a teacher proves that his actions were protected under the 
first amendment and that his constitutionally protected actions were 
the reasons for the adverse employment considerations given him, the 
defendant board must then show that it would have reached the same 
employment considerations irrespective of the employee's first amend­
ment conduct. When a board of education fails to show that it would 
71 
have reached the same decision as in Zoll, the teacher is usually 
awarded backpay, attorney's fees and reinstatement. 
Reinstatement was the issue in Allen v. Autauga County Board of 
162 
Education. In Allen, two teachers circulated signed petitions to 
the state school board questioning the board's use of state funds. 
Their contracts were nonrenewed and both teachers brought Section 1983 
suits charging violations of first amendment quarantees. They asked 
for damages, back pay, reinstatement to their teaching positions, 
costs, and attorney's fees. The district court determined that the 
involvement of the teachers in circulating the letter to the state 
school board was the motivating reason for their dismissal and further 
that it was constitutionally protected conduct. The court granted 
the plaintiff's request for damages, costs, and attorney's fees but 
denied reinstatement. Reinstatement was denied since the district 
court concluded that it would "breed difficult working conditions" 
and due to "a lack of mutual trust . . . which is essential in the 
163 operation of a school." 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
ordered reinstatement. The court concluded that "reinstatement is 
a basic element of the appropriate remedy in wrongful employee 
1626bb F. 2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1982). For a case involving a 
teacher that claimed his dismissal was based on his letter to the 
state athletic association see Williams v. Day, 412 F. Supp. 336 
(E.D. Ark. 1976). 
163Id. at 1304. 
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discharge cases and, except in extraordinary cases, is required.164 
The court wrote: 
Unless we are willing to withhold full relief from all 
or most successful plaintiffs in discharge cases, and 
we are not, we cannot allow actual or expected ill-
feeling alone to justify nonreinstatement. We also note 
that reinstatement is an effective deterrent in pre­
venting employer retaliation against employees who 
exercise their  const i tut ional r ights .165  
All letters critical of employers are not protected by the 
provisions of the first amendment as were Pickering's, Zoll's and 
Allen's. In Long v. Board of Education of City of St. Louis,166 
a teacher's contract was nonrenewed because she wrote a letter on 
board stationery to a state legislator critical of funding for a 
program for which she was employed. Her immediate supervisor, Ruby 
Long, was then notified that her position was terminated for her 
refusal to sign an unsatisfactory evaluation of the letter writing 
teacher. Both teachers appealed to the federal district court 
charging an abridgment of protections under the first amendment. The 
court noted that the incident differed from Pickering in that by using 
board stationery the teacher in Long appeared to be speaking not as 
a private citizen but for the board itself. In so doing the court 
decided that the "balance is clearly struck in favor of efficient 
167 
administration of the school district." 
164Id. at 1305. 
165Id. at 1306. 
166456 F. 2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1972). 
167Id. at 1060. 
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1 fift 
Alinovi v. Worchester School Committee is an unusual Section 
1983 case in that it involved both first and fourth amendment claims. 
The facts in Alinovi were that Joanne Alinovi, a fourth grade teacher, 
wrote a term paper for a special education class. In that paper she 
discussed both the child and criticized the pricipal's lack of knowl­
edge in dealing with a disturbed child. Alinovi brought her paper to 
a meeting held with the child's parents and other members of the 
child's Individualized Education Program (I.E.P.) team but the paper 
was not read. The following day her principal requested to read her 
paper. Because of her critical comments of the principal, Alinovi 
refused his request to read the paper. Three separate meetings were 
held over the next four months between herself, her attorney and the 
district administration over her refusal to allow the schol principal 
to read the paper, which they considered to be a part of the child's 
official file. 
At a Parents' Night, Alinovi posted three letters she had 
received from the administration concerning her refusal to allow the 
principal to read the paper next to the parent's sign-in sheet. 
Alinovi was suspended for two days without pay for posting the letters 
at the parent's meeting. During the next year she was involuntarily 
transferred to different programs which she claimed caused her to 
seek professional counseling. 
168777 F. 2d 776 (1st Cir. 1985). See also Boyce v. Alexis I. 
DuPont School District, 341 F. Supp. 678 (D. Del. 1972). 
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Alinovi filed suit in federal district court charging both 
first and fourth amendment violations. Her fourth amendment claim 
concerned her privacy interest in her cade study which she had refused 
to give to the principal. Alinovi claimed that the first amendment 
protected her in posting the letters from the school administration 
at parents' night. 
The district court and a majority of the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit held that Alinovi's privacy interest in her paper 
ended when she brought the paper to the I.E.P. meeting. The appeals 
court further found that since she had presented the paper to a 
college professor for grading and had offered it to a special educa­
tion official that "she should not have retained an expectation of 
• J id 69 privacy in said paper." 
The appeals court was unanimous in affirming the district 
court's decision that Alinovi's posting the letters from the school 
administration was not protected speech. Referencing Conniek, the 
court held that "the resolution of a pending personnel problem 
between a public school teacher and her employer is not a metter of 
public concern."^0 
Many Section 1983 cases involving the abridgment of the first 
amendment center on the definition of what constitutes matters of 
public concern. In McGee v. South Pemiscot School District^ and 
169Id. at 785. 
170Id. at 787. 
171712 F. 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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Anderson v. Central Point School District, the contracts of two 
coach-s were nonrenewed due to letters written to the editor and to 
members of the board of education. In McGee, a teacher and track 
coach, wrote a letter to the local paper critical of the board's 
decision to exclude track as a team sport three days prior to a board 
election. Shortly after the election, McGee's contract was nonre­
newed. A jury awarded McGee damages for his first amendment violation 
but the court granted the defendant school board's motion for a 
judgment non obstante veredicto. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the dis­
trict court's decision that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's findings. The appeals court rejected the board's 
contentions that McGee's letter was not constitutionally protected 
since it did not address a public issue and it contained erroneous 
statements. The court pointed to a statement made by the superinten­
dent to McGee: 
You are supposed to be loyal to the school. Whenever you 
say things that embarrass the school or say things we 
don't like, you will get what's coming to you. You know, 
you'll get terminated J 73 
In Anderson a teacher appeared before the board of education 
and spoke on the issue of athletics. He followed his speech with a 
172746 F. 2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Knapp v. Whitaker, 
757 F. 2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985). appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 36 
(1985). 
173McGee, at 343. 
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letter to each board member criticizing the present athletic policy 
and suggested changes. Superintendent Groshong replied in a letter 
to Anderson admonishing him for communicating directly with board 
members and indicating that he would no longer be assigned coaching 
duties. He sent copies of his letter to the board members, the 
athletic director and Anderson's principal. 
Anderson sued under Section 1983 charging an abridgment of his 
rights under the first amendment. The court found for Anderson and 
granted him damages for physical and emotional distress. The court 
further entered an injunction against the application of the 
"channels" policy on matters of public concern. In affirming the 
district court's decision the appeals court rejected the board's 
argument that under Connick it was justified in nonrenewing Anderson's 
contract as it considered it not to be of general public interest. 
Finally, the appeals court rejected the board's argument that 
Anderson's claim was not maintainable under Section 1983 since he had 
174 suffered no loss of salary. Citing Carey as controlling, the 
court held that physical and emotional distress is compensationable 
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
The courts maintain that it is within the rights of an employee 
to make a public written criticism of a school administration and 
school board when the issue is of public concern. A personnel problem 
between employer and employee has not been viewed as touching on 
174435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
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matters of public concern. The employer may not punish employees 
with nonreinstatement when they disagree on matters of public concern 
nor may the employer threaten nonreinstatement. Finally, physical 
and emotional distress may be compensated under Section 1983. 
Filing of Grievances and Union Activities 
Dismissals Based on the Filing of Grievances. Simple member­
ship and participation in an organization such as a teachers' union or 
association does not, by itself, preclude any rights inducing con­
tinual employment in the public schools. Because school boards and 
teacher unions often have adversarial relationships, however, many 
cases are litigated by teachers charging an abridgment of a consti­
tutionally protected right. 
An example of this type of case based on a dismissal for 
exercise of a first amendment right was Saye v. St. Vrain Valley 
School District RE-ljJ75 Diane Saye brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 charging that her dismissal was unconstitutional in that 
it was in retaliation for her union activities and her remarks made 
to parents. 
Saye had been informed by her principal that, although she 
received a high evaluation, she would be recommended for transfer 
because of her difficulties with a serious emotionally disturbed 
student. As problems with the student continued, Saye was advised 
that her evaluation was being reconsidered. The following year Saye's 
175785 F. 2d 862 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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use of an instructional aide was reduced. She complained to the 
assistant director of special education and received more hours of 
aide assistance which disturbed other teachers and aides. Saye also 
discussed aide time with two parents of special education children. 
As a result, a meeting was held with the concerned parents, the 
director of special educ ation and her principal. 
The same year, Saye was elected faculty representative for the 
union. In that capacity she relayed to the faculty information con­
cerning contract negotiations and began hearing complaints from 
teachers about the practices of her principal. She was informed by 
her principal that he was considering recommending nonrenewal of her 
contract for precipitating the aide situation. Saye responded by 
filing a union grievance alleging that the memo was harassment in 
retaliation for her activities on behalf of the teacher union. 
In discussing the issues of the case the court relied heavily 
on the language of both Pickering and Connick. Citing also the three-
176 part analysis in Childers v. Independent School District concerning 
first amendment rights of employees, the court stated: 
Under this test, an employee's first amendment rights are 
protected unless the employer shows that some restriction 
is necessary to prevent the disruption of official func­
tions or to insure the effective performance by the employee. 
If an employee's activities are protected ... he must then 
demonstrate that this conduct was a "motivating factor" in 
the detrimental employment decision. The employer then 
176676 F. 2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 1982). 
79 
bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evi­
dence that it would have reached the same decision . . . 
in the absence of the protected activity J7? 
The court found that allocation of teacher aide time was not 
a matter inherently of public concern and that Saye did not raise the 
matter in a public forum and was speaking "not as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern but instead as an employee upon metters of 
178 personal interest." The court denied that Saye's conversations to 
parents of her students was protected by first amendment guarantees: 
The parents of a child receiving special education must 
work closely and trustfully with teachers and administrators 
in implementing the legally mandated individualized educa­
tion program for that child. Saye's discussions with the 
two parents here disrupted that necessary relationship and 
required defendants to call a meeting to explain the 
situation and to attempt to reestablish an amicable and 
cooperative atmosphereJ79 
The court of appeals differed from the district court, however, 
in finding that Saye's union activities could have been a motivating 
factor in her dismissal. The court pointed to evidence that her 
principal had informed the superintendent of Saye's union activities 
as faculty representative. The appeals court dismissed her claim of a 
denial of a first amendment right but remanded and reversed the 
district court's decision that her union activities had played no 
part in her dismissal. 
177Id. at 1341. 
178Id. at 866. 
179Id. at 866. 
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ion  
The case, Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools, is similar to 
Saye in that it also centered on the nonrenewal of two teachers who 
charged that they were released because they had filed grievance 
forms. In Roberts two teachers submitted grievances to the Arkansas 
Education Association and gave copies of them to their principal. 
Two of the grievances expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in 
which a class trip was conducted, while the third expressed concern 
over the necessity of sacrificing "Weekly Readers" in order to have 
other instructional supplies. One teacher, Roberts, also charged that 
her nonrenewal was based on her union activities. 
The following year the principal lowered the teachers' evalua­
tions to the "needs to improve" category and recommended to the 
district that their contracts not be renewed. The superintendent 
recommended that the board nonrenew their contracts and the board 
unanimously agreed. The teachers unsuccessfully requested a hearing 
before the board. 
In deciding the case, the court looked to the reasoning advance 
advanced by the Supreme Court in Pickering, Connick, and Mt. Healthy. 
In discussing the three cases the court identified the "Pickering 
balance" as" 
(1) the need for harmony in the office or workplace; 
(2) whether the government's responsibilities require a 
close working relationship to exist between the plaintiff 
and co-workers when the speech in question has caused or 
could cause the relationship to deteriorate; (3) the time, 
manner, and place of the speech, (4) the context in which 
180773 F. 2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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the dispute arose; (5) the degree of public interest in 
the speech; and (6) whether the speech impeded the 
employee's ability to perform his or her duties.181 
Citing both Pickering and Connick, the court concluded that the 
teachers' allegation charging an abridgment of a first amendment right 
did not involve protected speech. The court, citing Keller v. 
182 Flawn reasoned that the teachers' grievances regarding "Weekly 
Readers" was not protected speech. The court stated: 
The concerns underlying the Pickering balance suggest 
that a government as an employer has a legitimate 
interest in achieving compliance with decisions that, 
while once open to dispute and discussion, have been 
made through proper channels.183 
The court could not determine if Roberts' union association and duties 
played any part of the board's decision to nonrenew her contract and 
thus remanded that part back for a new trial. 
Like Roberts, a teacher in Cox v. Dardanelle Public School 
184 District claimed that her nonrenewal was in retaliation for the 
grievance she entered against the school principal. Nancy Cox and two 
other teachers who entered grievances were either dismissed or placed 
181Jtt. at 954. 
182761 F. 2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1985) "It is firmly established 
that the First Amendment's shield does not extend to speech and 
conduct amounting to insubordination directed at school officials." 
183Id. at 956. 
184790 F. 2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986). Also, Johnson v. Butler, 
433 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
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on probation. Cox was notified in her dismissal letter that she was 
being dismissed for eleven specific charges. 
The board of education, in Cox's dismissal hearning, held that 
one of the charges was false, fourt charges were true but not suffi­
cient for grounds of nonrenewal and two charges were true and were 
sufficient for nonrenewal. One charge was withdrawn by the board's 
attorney. The two charges held as sufficient were: (1) Cox refused 
to follow directions as she had signed in for a fellow teacher on 
five different occasions; and (2) she allowed a visitor to interrupt 
her class without permission from the principal. 
The district court held that Cox's dismissal was based, not 
on the two reasons given by the board, but for the entering of 
frievances against her principal, an action it held as constitu­
tionally protected. Cox was awarded damages for the wrongful dis­
missal and the board appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held Cox's 
speech, "was composed of more than criticisms of internal personnel 
185 
policies, but touched on matters of public concern." The court 
further found that there was no evidence that Cox's speech either 
affected her teaching performance, aggravated her relationship with 
her principal or that her criticisms throughout the year were 
intemperate or antagonistic. 
185Id. at 673. 
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Yet still another case where charges that a teacher's nonre­
newal was based on the entering of a grievance is found in Day v. 
•J og 
South Park Independent School District. The facts in the case were 
that Marvis Day had received a satisfactory evaluation from her 
principal in eighteen of twenty-four skill areas but less than satis­
factory in six categories. The principal recommended a transfer 
stating that Day had demonstrated little skill in working with peers, 
and she would possibly perform better in another environment. Day, 
through a letter, complained to the principal over the negative 
evaluation and asked for suggestions as to how she could improve. The 
principal did not respond to her letter and Day entered a formal 
grievance. The superintendent responded to Day's grievance that her 
complaint was not grievable. At the end of the year she was notified 
that her contract was to be nonrenewed. Day appealed both her denied 
request for a grievance hearing and her nonrenewal to the state 
commissioner of education and later to the federal district court. 
The state commissioner of education held that the school district's 
policies prohibited retaliation for an employee's exercise of 
grievance rights and directed the case, sub judice, to arbitration. 
The district court held that Day's dismissal was based on her 
request for grievance concerning her low evaluation and, as such, was 
not a matter of public concern but rather a private matter and thus 
afforded no first amendment protection. The appeals court agreed with 
the district court that Day's complaint was "purely a private matter" 
186768 F. 2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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and that she did not speak "as a citizen upon matters of public con­
cern but only as an individual with individual personal disputes and 
187 
grievances." Citing Connick, the court wrote: 
Connick dictates sensitivity to the form and content 
of the employee's speech. An employee's complaint to 
her superior on a personal matter is no more a matter 
of public concern when embodied in a letter to him 
requesting a hearing than it is when spoken to him. 
We are hesitant to elevate such an employee's complaint 
to the level of constitutional protection merely because 
she has asserted it in the form of a grievance."8 
Dismissals Based on Union Activity. Often teachers are dis­
missed for their participation in teacher unions and associations. 
Since membership in a union or an association is a protected right, 
it is left to the teacher to prove that his or her membership was the 
motivating factor for the adverse employment decision. 
189 In Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School District a 
teacher was informed that his contract was not to be renewed on 
grounds that he had lost his effectiveness as a teacher due to unsub­
stantiated rumors of improper behavior toward three female students, 
one being the daughter of one board member. Chase, an officer in the 
local teacher association, had been recommended for contract renewal 
by both his principal and his department chairman with the highest 
possible ratings. Donald Chase argued that his nonrenewal was in 
direct violation of both his freedom of speech and association. The 
187Id. at 700. 
188Id. at 703. 
189330 F. Supp. 388 (D. N.H. 1971). 
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court found for Chase, stating, "The plaintiff's negotiating activi­
ties had a profound bearing, either consciously or unconsciously, on 
190 the decision not to renew." Chase was awarded damages by the 
court from the district, the superintendent, and five members of the 
board of education. He was ordered reinstated and the superintendent 
was ordered to expunge any record of his nonrenewal from his personnel 
folder. 
191 Newborn v. Morrison was a similar case involving the nonre­
newal of a teaching contract based on association with a teaching 
organization. The facts in Newborn were that Pamela Newborn charged 
that she was denied a renewal of her teaching contract due to the 
union activities of her husband, the executive secretary of the 
Illinois Education Association. Newborn charged in her complaint that 
she was denied the protections afforded by the first, ninth and four­
teenth amendments. The defendant school board entered several argu­
ments for dismissal including: (1) that Newborn had not exhausted the 
administrative remedies before proceeding with a federal action; 
(2) that the school board as a municipal corporation was not amendable 
to a suit based on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and (3) that since the 
school board was required to indemnify members sued for civil rights 
damages, that any awards would ultimately come from the public 
treasury and thus violate the eleventh amendment. 
190Id. at 396. 
191440 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. 111. 1977). 
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The district court judge handled each allegation and argument 
for dismissal separately in finding for the plaintiff. The court 
first stated that although no right of privacy is mentioned in the 
Constitution, one does exist. Citing several cases including Roe v. 
192 193 
Made and Griswold v. Connecticut the district court listed four 
rights enjoyed through marriage. The court continued by stating, "It 
is my opinion that marriage is clearly a fundamental right and is 
entitled to the guarantee of privacy expressed in Roe and Griswold. 
The court next dealt with the appeal for dismissal in that 
Newborn had not exhausted state remedies. Because Newborn was a 
probationary teacher and did not have the "elaborate administrative 
review" of tenured teachers, the court decided to hear the case. The 
court rejected the board's contention that since it was a municipal 
corporation it was immune from suits based on Section 1983. The court 
also rejected the board's argument that since the board was a munici­
pal corporation that any monetary award would have to come from the 
public treasury. The court's rejection of this argument was because 
the board was being sued individually and not in its public capacity. 
^93 S. Ct. 726 (1973). This case effectively legalized 
abortions in the United States. 
^381 U.S. 479 (1965). This case involved the Executive 
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a 
physician that were found guilty under Connecticut law that forbade 
giving married persons information and medical advice concerning 
how to prevent conception. 
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The remarks made by a teacher, who served as the president of 
the teacher's association at the opening orientation meeting, served 
as the basis for the teacher's dismissal and her subsequent appeal in 
194 Pietrunti v. Board of Education of Brick Township. Kathleen 
Pietrunti had been invited to speak by the board to the teachers but 
used that opportunity to attack the school administration by dis­
cussing: (1) the dismissal of two nontenured teachers, (2) the 
suspension of a teacher, (3) the lack of black teachers in the school 
district, and (4) the removal of three books from the English curricu­
lum. She ended her address to the teachers by describing the superin­
tendent as a villain. She was suspended from her teaching position 
on September 7, 1971. The same day she distributed both copies of 
her speech and a written apology for her remarks. 
Pietrunti lost her appeal both to the Commissioner of Education 
and to the State Board of Education. She then appealed to the 
superior court which also agreed with the board. The court stated 
that her position as president of the local teachers' association did 
not grant her sufficient leave to openly use the orientation meeting 
as a platform for attacking the administration. 
As in previously discussed cases, litigation involving the 
filing of grievances and union activities emphasize that first amend­
ment rights are not protected when: (1) actions disrupt job 
194319 A. 2d 262. (N.J. 1974). 
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performance, aggravate professional relationships or are expressed 
in an antagonistic manner; (2) personal grievances are expressed; 
(3) grievances are expressed at the workplace; and (4) policies 
continue to be questioned after a reasonable time of debate. The 
litigation also points out that it is not advisable to involve 
parents in disagreements involving matters of personal interest, that 
a formal grievance or letter is viewed legally the same as a verbal 
complaint, and the right of privacy is guaranteed as it regards 
marri age. 
Academic Freedom 
The first amendment rights of teachers in the classroom to 
instruct their students as they see fit has remained an issue before 
the courts. The United States Supreme Court stated in Keyishian v. 
195 Board of Regents: 
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us 
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom 
is therefore a special concern of the first amendment, 
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.'9° 
Both state law and local board policies dictate to some extent 
the amount of academic freedom that teachers may enjoy in teaching 
195385 U.S. 589, (1967). 
196Id. at 603. 
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197 students. This freedom has a direct relationship with the age and 
maturity of the students involved and also to the prevailing sense of 
values that are expressed and accepted by the community. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Mailloux v. 
198 199 Kiley and a federal district court in Parducci v. Rutland have 
ruled that academic freedom is not absolute. These two opinions 
expressed the limits of freedoms that teachers have in instructing 
their students. The Mailloux court wrote: 
Free speech does not grant teachers a license to say or 
write in class whatever they may feel like, and that 
the propriety of regulations or sanctions must depend on 
such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the 
students, the closeness of the relation between the 
specific technique used and some concededly valid educa­
tional objective, and the contest and manner of presenta­
tion ... We see no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry 
into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities 
are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's 
speech.200 
197 Academic freedom can not be used to avoid teaching certain 
issues or subjects as was the case in Palmer v. Board of Education 
for the City of Chicago, 605 F. 2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied 444 U.S. 1026 (1980) and Ahern v. Board of Education of School 
District of Grand Island, 456 F. 2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972). 
198448 F. 2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1971). 
199316 F. Supp. 352 (D. Ala. 1972) 
200Id. at 1245. 
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The Parducci court wrote: 
Although academic freedom is not one of the enumerated 
rights of the first amendment, the Supreme Court has on 
numerous occasions emphasized that the right to teach, to 
inquire, to evaluate, and to study is fundamental to a 
democratic society. The right to academic freedom, how­
ever, like all other constitutional rights, is not 
absolute, and must be balanced against the competing 
interests of society.201 
Often teachers attempt to use the umbrella of academic freedom 
to incorporate their religious, politifal, and social views and 
values into the classroom. The following cases involve litigation 
between dismissed teachers and their superordinates over the amount 
of freedom that teachers have in their classrooms. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Dircuit in James v. Board 
202 of Education of Central District reversed a lower court in finding 
that the wearing of a black armband was constitutionally protected 
speech. James, a Quaker, had worn an armband on two separate 
occasions to school where he taught literature in protest of the war 
in Vietnam. On the first instance he was suspended and then rein­
stated on the condition that he "engage in no political activities 
203 while in the school." The second time he wore the armband he was 
discharged. The district court granted the school board's motion for 
dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and that none of James's 
federally protected rights were violated. 
20^Parducci at 353. 
202461 F. 2d 566 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
203Id. at 569. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the find­
ings that James was precluded on bringing forth his complaint under 
res judicata. The court also noted the wearing of the armband created 
no classroom disturbances. The school board argued that a school 
should not wait for a disturbance before it takes action. It further 
argued that this case was unlike Tinker v. Board of Education204 in 
that a teacher, in expressing a political view, has far more pervasive 
influence over a student than does a statement made by a student. The 
court rejected both arguments. It wrote: 
It is appropriate, however, lest our decision today (which 
is based on the total absence of any facts justifying the 
Board of Education's actions) be misunderstood, that we 
disclaim any intent to condone partisan political activities 
in the public schools which reasonably may be expected to 
interfere with the educational process.205 
In another case involving academic freedom, a federal district 
one 
court in Moore v. School Board of Gulf County ruled that a teacher 
could not spend class time expounding his views of the superintendent 
and the school system. The facts in the case were that Melvin Moore, 
a tenth grade biology teacher repeatedly used class time to discuss 
the problems of the school system including the superintendent and 
school board. He also discussed with his class other topics such as 
204393 U.S. 502 (1969). 
205Id. at 576. 
20®364 F. Supp. 555 (D. Fla. 1972). For somewhat similar cases 
see Robins v. Board of Education, 313 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. 111. 1970) 
and Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 
1970). 
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his personal experiences with prostitutes. Several parents complained 
to the school board about the wasted instructional time and the 
controversial talks that he was having with the students in class. 
The school board decided to offer him a contract provided that he not 
use his class time on subjects unrelated to biology. Moore refused 
the probationary contract and was dismissed. The court, in holding 
for the school board, concluded that tenth grade students had a 
right not to be subjected as a captive audience in listening to the 
subjective views of their teacher. The court further held that by 
subjecting students to listen to a teacher expound his criticisms in 
class against the school administration that they might tend to hold 
other teachers and the school board in "varying degrees of contempt." 
Many complaints regarding academic freedom arise out of 
science and literature classes for both religious and moral reasons. 
Often the teachings of teachers in these two areas diametrically 
oppose those beliefs and customs held by parents. As in Moore, the 
207 complaints in Stachura v. Truszkowski arose from events that 
occurred in a high school biology class. Edward Stachura, a teacher 
in the Memphis School System, brought a Section 1983 suit in federal 
court alleging a denial of his first amendment rights. Stachura 
showed two films in his life science class, "From Boy to Man" and 
"From Girl to Woman." The films had been obtained from the county 
health department and had been shown to students at the school 
207764 F. 2d 211 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Kingsville Inde­
pendent School District v. Cooper, 611 F. 2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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previously without objections. Parental permission was required by 
the school and the films were shown to sexually segregated classes 
at the direction of the principal and with the approval of the board 
of education. 
Delores Truszkowski, a parent, organized a group of parents 
who complained to the school board about the subject matter in the two 
films. The school board met the day following the presentation of 
the films and suspended Stachura for an indefinite period of time. 
The superintendent told Stachura that "he would never see the inside 
208 
of a Memphis classroom again." Approximately one month later the 
superintendent handed Stachura a letter of reprimand. Stachura, 
through his attorney, asked for immediate reinstatement and the 
removal of his letter of reprimand from his personnel file. Stachura 
then brought suit in federal district court. The district court held 
that Stachura's first amendment rights had been violated but set 
aside the jury awarded damages against Truskowski, citing her first 
amendment right to petition the board. The court of appeals affirmed 
the district court's award of substantial punitive and compensatory 
209 damages. The court noted that "the actions of the school board 
208Id. at 214. 
209 On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the award of damages back to the district court. The 
district court judge had instructed the jury that if they found the 
board liable they could award (1) compensatory damages for harm to 
respondent, (2) punitive damages, and (3) compensatory damages for 
violations of constitutional rights. The Court rejected the third 
category. 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986). 
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imposed a stigma on Stachura and foreclosed a definite range of 
210 employment opportunities." 
Teacher assigned reading materials were the subject of the suit 
211 
in Keefe v. Geanakos. The facts in Keefe were that Robert Keefe 
gave his senior English students copies of "Atlantic Monthy" magazine 
and assigned them the first article to read. Keefe discussed the 
article and particularly an obscene word found in the article. The 
following evening the school committee met and asked Keefe to defend 
his assigning the article that included the objectionable word. Keefe 
was asked at the meeting to refrain from using the word in class again 
to which he refused. He was then suspended and filed an appeal in 
district court requesting an injunction to prevent the school board 
from voting on his discharge. The district court refused and Keefe 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
The appeals court found the article to be "scholarly, thought-
212 ful and thought-provoking." It found the offensive word to be 
important to the development of the thesis. The court, in reversing 
the district court, noted that the offensive word appeared in at 
210Id- at 215. 
211418 F. 2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) 
212Id. at 361. 
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least five books in the school's library. The court wrote: 
Hence the question in this case is whether a teacher may, 
for demonstrated educational purposes, quote a "dirty" 
word currently used in order to give special offense, or 
whether the shock is too great for high school seniors to 
stand. If the answer were that the students must be pro­
tected from such exposure, we would fear for their future. 
We do not question the good faith of the defendants in 
believing that some parents have been offended. With the 
greatest of respect to such parents, their sensibilities 
are not the full measure of what is proper education.213 
The ruling in Keefe was cited in Lindros v. Governing Board of 
214 Torance School District. Stanley Lindros, a tenth grade English 
teacher assigned his students to write a story and then read to them 
one of his stories that contained a vulgar phrase. The school board 
refused to rehire him for the next year stating that his "coarse and 
vulgar expression showed extremely poor judgment." Lindros appealed 
the board's decision on the ground that his nonrenewal violated his 
first amendment protection of free speech. The California Court of 
Appeals, in denying Lindros's claim, stated that academic freedom 
215 "does not signify the absence of all restraint." The court further 
distinguished the facts between Lindros and Keefe in that Keefe was 
a tenured teacher; the article assigned in Keefe was scholarly while 
while Lindros's article was not, and finally, there was a two-year 
age difference in the students in the two cases. 
213Id_. at 362. 
214108 Ca. Rptr. 188 (Cal. 1972). 
215Id. at 40. 
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Teachers have claimed academic freedom in not only their right 
to speak on topics of their pleasure in the classroom but also to 
govern both what is said and done by the students in nonacademic 
areas. In Russo v. Central School District No. 1, Towns of Rush, 
216 Etc., N.Y. Susan Russo was appointed as a probationary art 
teacher for the Rush-Henrietta School District. As a condition of 
her employment she signed a loyalty oath affirming her support of 
217 the Constitution of the United States and of New York. In the 
fall of the year the teachers were notified that they were expected 
to salute the flag and join in the pledge of allegiance to it with 
their students while it was being spoken over the school's public 
address system. Refusing to salute the flag or to recite the pledge 
of allegiance with her students in homeroom, Russo instead stood 
quietly looking at the flag and kept her hands at her side. The 
district court noted that at no time did this cause any disturbance 
218 in the classroom. 
In April some students and parents reported to the principal 
that Russo was not saluting the flag. The principal observed her 
the day after the complaint. The following day he called her into 
his office and asked her why she was not saluting the flag and pledg­
ing allegiance to it. She responded that the phrase, "with liberty 
216469 F. 2d 623 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
217Id. at 625. 
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for all" did not, in her mind, reflect the quality of life in 
219 
America. The following month the principal again observed her 
during the pledge of allegiance. Russo again failed to salute the 
flag or to recite the pledge of allegiance. At the observation 
meeting, Loughlin, her principal, told Russo that he intended to ask 
the board that her contract be nonrenewed. When asked for his 
rationale, the principal responded that since Russo was a probationary 
teacher that he was not compelled to give reasons. 
The appeals court, in reversing the district court's decision, 
220 cited extensively its decision in James v. Board of Education. The 
court noted that Mrs. Russo made "no attempt to proselytize her 
students" and that no disruption resuled from her silence during the 
pledge. The court concluded with: 
The right to remain silent in the face of an illegitimate 
demand for speech is as much a part of First Amendment 
protections as the right to speak out in the face of an 
illegitimate demand for silence. To compel a person to 
speak what is not in his mind offends the very principles 
of tolerance and understanding which for so long have 
been the foundation of our great land.221 
Safeguarding academic freedom is fundamental to a democratic 
society. Yet courts stipulate that such freedom is not absolute and 
must be determined in a case by case investigation based upon the 
219Id. at 626. 
220Supra. 
221 Id. at 634. 
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following issues: (1) age and maturity of students; (2) values 
generally accepted by the community; (3) whether or not the specific 
technique employed is based upon a legitimate educational objective; 
and (4) the manner in which the information is presented. 
Teacher Appearance and Private Life 
Teacher dress and grooming have frequently been claimed to be 
a right protected by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of 
expression. Most of the litigation in this area arises out of 
teachers wearing or not wearing a particular type of clothing and the 
issue of hair, including facial hair. 
222 Teacher Appearance. Lucia v. Duggan . was a massachusetts 
case involving the dismissal of a nontenured teacher for violating an 
unpublished rule that all men teachers should be clean shaven. Lucia 
came to school following Christmas vacation with a beard which 
prompted the superintendent to advise him that the district had an 
unwritten rule against beards. Lucia was later advised by both the 
school principal and the school committee that they found his wearing 
a beard objectionable. Neither the superintendent, principal nor the 
school committee advised Lucia that he would be discharged if he 
223 failed to shave. The school committee unanimously voted to dismiss 
^303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). See also Finot v. 
Pasadena City Board of Education, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. App. 1967). 
223Id. at 117. 
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Lucia but refused to give any reasons for the dismissal. Lucia 
appealed his case to the federal district court which found for him. 
The court found that his dismissal violated constitutional standards 
under the fourteenth amendment and ordered Lucia's reinstatement with 
224 back pay and compensatory damages. 
A somewhat similar case involving facial hair can be found in 
225 Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval County, Florida. 
Braxton, the only black member on the school's facility, refused to 
shave off his goatee. Braxton appealed his dismissal to the federal 
court which held-that the school system's insistence on Braxton's 
shaving off his goatee to be arbitrary, unreasonable and based on 
O O f .  
personal preference. The court concluded that the order requiring 
the black teacher to shave his goatee exhibited an intolerance of 
racial diversity. The court continued by stating that the goatee is 
considered as a symbol of racial pride and that the defendant board 
of education's refusal to renew Braxton's contract amounted to 
227 "institutional racism." 
The requirement of the wearing of ties for all male teachers 
was the Section 1983 issue in East Hartford Education Association v. 
224Id- at 161. 
225303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969). 
226Id/ at 959. 
227Id. at 960. 
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228 Board of Education. The district court found for the board of 
education and the teacher's association appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court, in reversing the district 
court remanded the case for consideration, suggesting that a teacher's 
appearance amounted to a type of method of teaching and, as such, 
could not be completely regulated by the board. The court wrote: 
A school board may make regulations that help to promote 
the effective and efficient education of children. It 
may not, however, make regulations that infringe on 
constitutional interests while not realistically and pig 
significantly furthering the board's proper purposes. 
Political Activity. Courts have generally held that the 
private lives of teachers, including their political activity is 
constitutionally protected as long as their activities do not have 
a detrimental effect on the school or pose harm to other teachers or 
students. A court in Jarvella v. Willoughly Eastlake City School 
230 District ruled that the private life of a teacher was protected as 
long as the conduct was not "hostile to the welfare of the school 
community." 
Because teachers hold a special place in the fabric of American 
society many courts, through their decisions, have diluted some 
teacher freedoms by agreeing with certain restrictions imposed by 
228562 F. 2d 838 (2nd Cir. 1977). See also Tardif v. Quinn, 
545 F. 2d 761 (1st Cir. 1976) where a teacher charged that her dis­
missal was based on the length of her skirt. 
2^°12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E. 2d 143 (Ohio court of Common 
Pleas, 1967). 
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boards of education on teachers. Courts have held that restrictions 
concerning the appearance of teachers have been made to help promote 
231 traditional values and respect for authority. Similarly, courts 
have upheld the dismissal of teachers when their political involve­
ment, living arrangements or sexual preferences created a significant 
educational disruption. 
232 Montgomery v. White involved the nonrenewal of a teacher due 
to his participation in political activities, conduct prohibited by 
the board of education. The court ruled that not all political 
activity is permissible in that a school system "may have legitimate 
interest in protecting its educational and administrative activities 
233 from undue political activity." The court found, however, that a 
complete ban on the participation of teachers in the political process 
created a "harmful effect on the community in depriving it of the 
political participation and interest of some of the most influential 
234 citizens." The court wrote: 
Simply because teachers are on the public payroll does not 
make them second-class citizens in regard to their 
231In Stoddard v. School District No. 1., 590 F. 2d 829 (10th 
Cir. 1979) an elementary teacher was successful in her suit charging 
that her dismissal was due to (1) recurring rumors that she was having 
an affair, (2) dissatisfaction of the community with her card playing 
and not attending church, and (3) because she did not have an 
attractive physical appearance. 
232Civ. Action No. 4933, Slip. Op. (U.S.C.C. E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 
1969). See also Holley v. Seminole County School District, 755 F. 2d 
1492 (11th Cir. 1985). 
233Id. at 2. 
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constitutional rights. Even though the governmental 
purposes are legitimate and substantial, such purposes 
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda­
mental personal liberties when the ends sought can be 
more narrowly achieved. Laws and official regulations 
which restrict the liberties guaranteed by the first 
amendment should_be narrowly drawn to meet the specific 
evil aimed at.23b 
Lifestyles. Boards of education have been upheld in their 
dismissal of teachers when a teacher's lifestyle, including his or her 
sexual preference, created an adverse impact on the educational 
236 
process. Sexual misconduct between teachers and students has been 
consistently held as just cause for dismissal. 
In an unusual Section 1983 case a Massachusetts teacher was 
dismissed for what the board charged as "conduct unbecoming a 
237 teacher." Wishart, a middle school teacher, had been seen on many 
occasions in his yard both dressing and undressing a mannequin. 
Wishart filed suit in federal court challenging that his conduct away 
from school was private and could not be used as basis for dismissal. 
The district court disagreed, noting that because his "conduct was 
public in nature or at least was carried on with such reckless dis­
regard of whether or not he was observed that it lost whatever 
238 private character it might have had." 
236 
However in Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn School 
District No. 17, 636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. 111. 1986), a federal court 
upheld a teacher who was discharged for her out-of-wedlock pregnancy. 
^Wishart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530 521 (D. Mass. 1973). 
238Id. at 535. 
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Many courts have held that social or sexual misconduct by 
teachers must be open and notorious to be used as grounds for dis-
239 missal. In Fisher v. Synder a teacher who allowed her son's male 
and female friends to stay overnight at her apartment was dismissed. 
Noting that no evidence was presented by the board concerning any 
adverse community reactions concerning Fisher, the court concluded 
that "idle speculation certainly does not provide a basis in fact for 
240 
the board's conclusory inference." However, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the dismissal of an unmarried female teacher who lived with a 
241 male friend. The court held that the teacher's lifestyle created 
a significant adverse educational effect on the school community. 
Courts have expressed a wide range of interpretations concern­
ing the homosexual or bisexual teacher. Some courts have upheld 
board of education for dismissing teachers on the knowledge of their 
242 sexual preferences. Other courts have suggested that the mere 
acknowledgment of homosexuality or bisexuality is not sufficient for 
239476 F. 2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973). 
240Id_. at 377. 
^Sullivan v. Meade Independent School District No. 101, 530 
F. 2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976). However in Thompson v. Southwest School 
District, 483 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Mo. 1980), a federal district court 
prevented the dismissal of a teacher who had lived with a man without 
wedlock. 
242Gaylord v. Tacoma School District. No. 10, 559 P. 2d 1340 
(Wash. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977), also Rowland v. Mad 
River Local School District, 730 F. 2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985). 
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dismissal. Sexual misconduct that results in criminal convictions 
has generally be held sufficient for dismissal. 
Summary 
The freedoms of public school teachers to express themselves, 
though not absolute, is protected by the first amendment as long as 
their expressions meet certain criteria. First, their speech must be 
addressed to matters of public concern. Second, the speech or expres­
sion must not be such that it would create a barrier to the smooth 
operation of the school. Third, public criticisms by teachers of 
their superordinates must not be made unless based on substantiated 
facts. Fourth, teachers may conduct their classes as they see fit as 
long as their classroom speech takes into account the age, sophistica­
tion and cultural background of their students. The classroom is not 
the place for a teacher to expound on his or her personal religious, 
social, political or sexual beliefs. Finally, teachers may conduct 
their personal lives as they please as long as their conduct does 
not create barriers to the educational process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
and to determine how it protects public school teachers in the 
exercise of their first amendment rights. The study was accomplished 
by both reviewing the creation of the Act and analyzing state and 
federal court decisions involving public school teachers that claimed 
abridgment of the Act through their free speech rights. The study 
was delimited to examining only litigation involving Section 1983 
where public school teachers charged an abridgment of their free 
speech rights. It was further delimited by treating only cases 
243 decided from Pickering v. Board of Education through December 31, 
1986. A variety of sources were used to reveal cases based on these 
delimitations, 
Cases based on Section 1983 that involved allegations of free 
speech violations were analyzed and interpreted to answer the six 
research questions presented in Chapter I. The research questions 
were as follows: 
1. To what extent does Section 1983 protect teachers in areas 
of private and public verbal and written criticisms of a 
superordiante? 
243391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
106 
2. To what extent does Section 1983 protect teachers with 
regards to academic freedom to speak on controversial 
issues in the classroom? 
3. To what extent does Section 1983 protect the rights of 
teachers to regulate their dress and appearance? 
4. To what extent does Section 1983 protect teachers that 
engage in political and union activity? 
5. To what extent are public school teachers protected by 
Section 1983 in their social lifestyle including their 
sexual preference? 
6. What remedies are available to teachers whose rights have 
been abridged by their superordinates? 
Findings 
Findings concerning the six research questions are based on 
state and federal court decisions 
Verbal and Written Cirticisms of a Superordinate 
1. Courts have upheld verbal and written criticisms by 
teachers concerning a superordinate provided that the criticisms 
addressed matters of public concern and were not outweighed by the 
state's interest as employer in promoting the efficient operation of 
the school. 
2. To determine the first amendment protections of criticisms 
of superordinates, courts considered the need for harmony in the 
workplace, the time, manner and forum used in presenting the speech, 
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the degree of public interest involved in the speech, and the context 
in which the criticism was presented. 
3. Courts held that teachers, by holding a special place in 
the fabric of American society, have somewhat less freedom to 
publically criticize a superordinate than do members of other pro­
fessions. 
4. The rights of teachers to engage in public discussion or 
debate concerning issues of public interest lessened once decisions 
are reached by the administration. 
5. Teachers enjoy no first amendment protection when their 
speech is on issues that are not of public concern. 
6. Teachers must first prove that their speech was protected 
by first amendment guarantees and the speech was a substantial and 
motivating factor in their adverse employment decision. Following 
that, their employers must then show that they would have reached the 
same employment decision regardless of the protected speech. 
7. Teachers' private verbal and written communications enjoy 
the same protections as public communications. 
8. Teachers who made threats against their superordinates 
were not protected by the first amendment. 
9. Teachers were not protected when they used their classrooms 
to make personal attacks on the school administration. 
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Academic Freedom 
1. Courts have held that the first amendment does not grant 
teachers the license of unlimited speech in the classroom. 
2. Courts have considered aspects such as the age and maturity 
of the students, the values generally accepted by the community, the 
relevancy of the speech to educational objectives and the manner by 
which information is presented to determine if speech was protected. 
3. Courts have rejected the idea that teachers have the right 
to determine the content of the school's instructional program. 
4. Teachers may not omit aspects of the curriculum they object 
to under the guise of academic freedom. 
Teacher Dress and Appearance 
1. Courts have held that dress and appearance of teachers have 
limited protections under the first amendment. 
2. School authorities may place restrictions on the personal 
appearance of teachers provided there is a rational basis for the 
regulation. 
3. The school administration has an interest in regulating the 
appearance and dress of teachers to help promote traditional values 
and respect for authority among students. 
Political and Union Activity 
1. The rights of teachers to participate in political and 
union activities are protected provided that the state has no com­
pelling interest in limiting these activities. 
109 
2. The participation by teachers in political or organiza­
tional activities outside the classroom are protected provided their 
actions do not disrupt job performance, aggravate professional rela­
tionships or are expressed in an antagonistic manner. 
3. The rights of teachers to engage in union activity are 
protected provided that personal grievances are not expressed, 
grievances are not expressed at school, and administrative policies 
are not questioned after a reasonable time for debate. 
4. Teachers may not use the classroom as a forum for politi­
cal or union purposes. 
Social Lifestyle 
1. Courts have held that teachers have a right of privacy con­
cerning their personal life choices including marriage and procrea­
tion. 
2. Courts have upheld boards of education in dismissing 
teachers whose sexual misconduct resulted in criminal convictions or 
who engaged in sexual activity with their students. 
4. Courts have expressed a wide range of interpretations con­
cerning the homosexual or bisexual teacher. In some areas the mere 
knowledge of a homosexual or bisexual preference has been sufficient 
grounds for dismissal while in other areas the teacher's sexual 
activity must be public and notorious to suffice for dismissal. 
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Remedies Available for Section 1983 Violations 
1. Courts have held that only nominal damages were available 
under Section 1983 to teachers who failed to prove a significant 
financial, professional or emotional loss. 
2. Compensatory damages were awarded to teachers under Section 
1983 to compensate them for their monetary loss. Compensatory damages 
were also awarded to teachers for their mental or emotional distress. 
They were also awarded to teachers who suffered professionally due 
to violations of their first amendment rights. 
3. Punitive or exemplary damages were awarded to teachers 
under Section 1983. 
4. Reinstatement to a former teaching position was usually 
awarded to the teacher that prevailed based on Section 1983 actions. 
Conclusions 
Based upon the analysis of the data the following conclusions 
regarding the limits of protected speech under Section 1983 are 
listed below. 
1. Teachers enjoy basically the same degree of freedom of 
speech as do other citizens. The Supreme Court has noted that neither 
teachers nor their students shed their constitutional rights on the 
school house steps. The state, through the administration of a school 
system, has an interest in promoting the efficient operation of the 
school. 
m 
2. Teachers may comment, either publicly or privately, on 
matters of public concern as long as their speech is not solely a 
personal attack on the school system or its superordinates. 
3. The speech of teachers in the classroom is protected as 
long as it contains potential educational value, is relevant to the 
instructional goals of the school, and takes into consideration the 
age and maturity of students and community values. 
4. The personal appearance of teachers has limited first 
amendment protection. A school system has a right to place restric­
tions on the personal appearance of teachers provided there is a 
rational basis for the restrictions such as helping promote tradi­
tional values and respect for authority among students. 
5. The private lives of teachers including their political or 
organizational activity, living arrangements and sexual preferences 
are protected provided their conduct is not hostile to the welfare 
of the school community. 
6. When teachers have suffered negative employment considera­
tions due to the exercise of protected speech, they may receive both 
compensatory and punitive damages from their superordinates. 
Recommendations for Educators 
Teachers, as all citizens, enjoy the basic rights provided 
through the Constitution and federal laws. These rights include the 
first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. These rights are not 
absolute and are dependent on the public or private nature of the 
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speech, the degree to which the speech is based on public or private 
criticisms, and the extent to which the state has a contervailing 
interest in limiting the speech of teachers to ensure the smooth 
operations of the public school. Based on these findings and conclu­
sions the following recommendations are made. 
1. Boards of education, superintendents, principals and board 
attorneys should become knowledgeable concerning the rights of 
teachers in exercising their first amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983. 
2. Teachers should educate themselves through college and 
graduate courses, through reading court decisions based on Section 
1983 and through professional organizations, such as NOLPE, concern­
ing the limits of protected speech. 
3. School districts should have written policies concerning 
the limits of speech freedoms including areas associated with speech, 
such as teacher dress, symbolic speech, and academic freedom. 
4. Efforts should continue for teachers and their superordi-
nates to keep abreast of future court decisions concerning the 
restrictions on speech of public school teachers. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
1. After the passage of a number of years, this study should 
be replicated. 
2. A study should be undertaken of the free speech rights of 
public school students. 
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3. A study should be undertaken of the judicial effect of 
negative statements made by superordinates of their employees. 
4. A study should be undertaken of the legal effect of 
administrative comments on teacher performance instruments. 
5. A study should be undertaken to ascertain the knowledge 
of administrators concerning the degree of freedom of speech for 
teachers. 
6. A study should be undertaken to compare the free speech 
rights of teachers with the rights of students and administrators. 
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